Bridging the Organizational Divide -- The Making of a Nonprofit Merger by John Emmeus Davis
The Making
Bridging the Organizational Divide
John Emmeus Davis
F O U N D E R
of a
Nonprofit
Merger
Bridging the Organizational Divide
The Making of a Nonprofit Merger
John Emmeus Davis
Burlington Associates in Community Development, LLC
P.O. Box 994
Burlington, VT 05402
802-651-0730
BurlAssoc@aol.com
Commissioned by
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation
New England District
607 Boylston Street, 5th Floor
Boston, MA 02116-4802
Copyright 2002
All Rights Reserved
I n t ro d u c t i o n : The Rise of Nonprofit Collaboration 1
I n c u b at i o n : Creating the Conditions for Collaboration 3
E x p l o rat i o n: Assessing the Potential for Collaboration 6
N ego t i at i o n : Planning the Merger 11
I m p l e m e n t at i o n : Completing the Merger 23
Re fl e c t i o n : Learning from the Merger Process 29
Ap p e n d i c e s: Appendix A: Chronology of the Nashua Merger
Appendix B: Proposed Sequence of Events
Appendix C: Comparison of Purposes and Programs
Appendix D: Recommended Beneficiaries for the Merged Organization
Appendix E: Comparison of Organizational Structures
Appendix F: Annual Operating Budget
Appendix G: GNHDF/FHNHS Merger: What’s Next?
Appendix H: Recommendations of the Merger Committee
Appendix I: Timeline for Completing the Merger
Appendix J: NHS of Greater Nashua: Strategic Plan, 2000–2003
Appendix K: Overview of New Hampshire Affordable Housing Network (19 97) 
c o n t e n t s
table of
( Appendix  B-K are listed
for information only)
Introduction
The Rise of Nonprofit
Collaboration
N
onprofit, community-based housing
development organizations have only
recently become significant players in the
provision of affordable housing, at least
in the United States.  Historically, this job was left
either in the hands of builders, developers, lenders
and landlords of the business sector or in the care of
agencies, planners and policymakers of the public
sector.  Only in the past 30 years has the provision of
affordable housing moved beyond the familiar
domains of the market and the state.  A host of non-
profit organizations is now playing a larger role in
constructing new housing, rehabilitating older hous-
ing, managing rentals and bringing home ownership
within the reach of thousands of people for whom
the American dream has proved elusive.  
The growth of these third-sector organizations has
been both rapid and impressive, but it also has been
uneven.  Across the country, there are places where
nonprofit housing development organizations are
both plentiful and productive, supported by sophisti-
cated networks of interorganizational collaboration,
public funding, private financing and technical
assistance.  There are many other communities,
however, where no nonprofits are engaged in afford-
able housing or where the ones that do exist are
very new or very small, accounting for only a hand-
ful of new housing units every year.
Lying between these two extremes are those com-
munities where multiple nonprofits of varying size
serve a similar geographic area, each producing a
modest but respectable number of housing units;
each competing for constituents, funding and devel-
opment opportunities; each struggling to survive.
The organizations that find themselves in this
uncomfortable situation often confront a special set
of challenges.  They are productive, but not prolific.
They are effective, but not efficient.  They are suc-
cessful, but not sustainable.  Indeed, they are fre-
quently quite precarious.  The loss of a single staff
person, the delay of a single project or the adverse
decision of a single funder can threaten not only
their short-term chances for success, but their long-
term prospects for survival.  
Those who sponsor and fund such organizations
sometimes find themselves in a situation where
competition among multiple nonprofits is weaken-
ing them all. In these cases, the sponsoring and
funding organizations have taken different tacks to
address this problem.  In some cases, they have
acted to strengthen every nonprofit, while working
to increase the division of labor or the division of
territory among them.  In other cases, they have
acted to strengthen one (or more) nonprofit at the
expense of the others, culling weaker performers
from the herd.  
While these have been the most common approach-
es for dealing with the weaknesses that organiza-
tional competition and duplication can sometimes
create, a third alternative has been gaining ground.
Multiple nonprofits, operating within the same juris-
diction, are being encouraged to collaborate — even
to the point of merging their programs, assets and
hard-won identities.  
Why is collaboration gaining in popularity?  A finan-
cial explanation would be that it is becoming harder
to find enough resources to strengthen every non-
profit to the same degree, funding multiple nonprof-
its to serve a similar clientele in the same locale.
There is also the political reality that public and pri-
vate funders find it difficult to choose easily (or
accurately) which nonprofits should live — and
which should die.  There is a practical explanation
as well.  Collaboration is becoming a strategy of
choice simply because it is proving to be an unusu-
ally effective way of achieving greater productivity,
efficiency and sustainability.  When a collaborative
(or a merger) is carefully crafted, the nonprofit part-
ners do a better job together than they did apart.  
This is not true in every case, of course.  
Collaboration is not always the best way to address
the weaknesses that can arise from multiple non-
profits serving the same locale and competing for
the same resources.  Merger is not always the best
way to craft a collaboration.  (The urge to merge
can, in fact, blind the most well-intentioned funders
and leaders of nonprofit organizations to consider-
ing other, perhaps better, ways of joining nonprofit
corporations together.)  Even when collaboration —
1
or, for that matter, a corporate merger — seems the
best choice in a particular situation, it does not
always succeed.  The form, funds or staff of the col-
laborative may prove inadequate.  Unanticipated
problems, inherited from one or more of the partici-
pating (or merging) organizations, may jeopardize
the partnership. Or collaboration may fail because
the commitment of the partners was half-hearted
from the start or because the spirit of cooperation
that drew them together evaporates.  
Beyond such obvious and general conclusions about
the success, or failure, of nonprofit collaborations,
little can be said with certainty about the ingredients
for a successful collaboration — especially among
housing development organizations.  These afford-
able housing collaborations are too recent and too
few to know precisely what does and does not work.
They are too varied in form and function to apply
too quickly the lessons learned from one case to
another.
Nevertheless, it can be said with some confidence
that the seeds for success (or failure) are probably
sown quite early. What happens during the process
of exploring, negotiating and joining together the
merger organizations will determine to a large
degree how well they will work together, how long
they will stay together, and how effectively and effi-
ciently they will use the resources made available to
them during their time together.  Admittedly, a good
process is insufficient by itself to guarantee the suc-
cess of a planned collaboration.  It is, however, a
necessary condition — and a solid foundation — for
all that follows.  
What makes a good process?  What has to happen in
the early days of exploring, planning and imple-
menting an affordable housing collaboration if it is to
h ave a good chance of succeeding — and enduring? 
The recent merger of two nonprofit housing devel-
opment corporations in Nashua, New Hampshire,
provides an opportunity to answer questions like
these, at least in a preliminary fashion.  The process
of completing the merger of French Hill
Neighborhood Housing Services (FHNHS) and the
Greater Nashua Housing and Development
Foundation (GNHDF), which were combined to
form Neighborhood Housing Services of Greater
Nashua, consumed nearly a year and a half.  The
merger was candidly discussed.  It was expertly
planned.  It was carefully executed.  It was respect-
fully monitored and generously supported by out-
side funders, including the Neighborhood
Reinvestment Corporation, which paid for the hand-
ful of consultants who helped make this merger
happen.  
It may be too soon to proclaim the product of this
process a complete success. This judgment depends
on whether gains in productivity, efficiency and sus-
tainability eventually result from the consolidated
organization that was created.  But it is not premature
to suggest that the process itself succeeded.  It did
what it was supposed to do, while meeting most of the
expectations of those who designed it, funded it and
contributed numerous hours of their own time towa r d
making the merger happen.  
Working as well as it did, there may be lessons in this
process of organizational matchmaking for other com-
munities considering nonprofit mergers of their ow n .
Nashua is worth a second look, therefore, ex a m i n i n g
what was done to bring FHNHS and GNHDF together
and reflecting on what went right, and what we n t
wrong, in making this merger a reality. i
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I n c u b at i o n
N
ashua is located in southern New
Hampshire, 10 miles from the
Massachusetts border.  Although small by
comparison with the nearby cities of
Manchester and Boston, Nashua is the second
largest city in the state, with a population of 85,000.
Forty years ago, the city had about half as many res-
idents.  Most of the population growth has occurred
since 1980, when many Massachusetts residents
began moving across the border to avoid paying
state income and sales taxes.  Nashua offered other
attractions as well: housing more affordable than
any in Massachusetts, safe neighborhoods, pleasant
surroundings, and a downtown that was undergoing
reinvestment and revitalization.  In 1997, Money
magazine named Nashua one of the best places to
live in the United States.
The population boom of the 1980s, while welcomed
by the city’s boosters, had an adverse impact on
lower-income residents seeking housing they could
afford, either to purchase or to rent.  The price of
housing spiraled higher every year.  Home owner-
ship moved out of reach, even for moderate-income
households.  In the rental market, vacancies moved
downward; rents moved upward.  
Although all of Nashua’s neighborhoods experienced
this upward pressure on housing prices, those with
higher concentrations of poverty felt it most keenly.
Two in particular, the French Hill neighborhood and
the Tree Streets neighborhood, saw housing prices
increase rapidly in the early 1980s without any
improvement in housing conditions.  Both of these
dense, residential neighborhoods contained many
dilapidated buildings, vacant lots and substandard
apartments.  Property changed hands in these neigh-
borhoods and rents went up, but little was invested
in the revitalization of the housing stock.  
Two nonprofit housing development organizations
were founded in Nashua during the late 1980s to
tackle these problems.  They were very similar
organizations.  Each was engaged in the provision of
affordable housing.  Each was committed to neigh-
borhood revitalization as an integral part of their
housing work.  Each was funded from the same pots
of federal, state and municipal money, along with
whatever private contributions they could attract in
a given year.
There were also differences.  The firstborn of these
Nashua nonprofits, the Greater Nashua Housing and
Development Foundation (GNHDF), was established
in 1988.  Its founders and directors were members
of municipal government, the public housing
authority, the business and banking community, and
social services organizations who had grown
increasingly concerned about the lack of affordable
rental housing, worsening conditions and rising
crime in the neighborhoods closest to Nashua’s
downtown.  GNHDF was created to work on all of
these problems.  
Operating initially out of offices provided by
Nashua’s public housing authority, GNHDF later re-
located to a former school building in the Tree
Streets neighborhood, sharing space with the city’s
community-policing program.  With a tiny staff
made up of an executive director and a part-time ad-
ministrative assistant, GNHDF got off to a slow start,
developing only 27 units between 1988 and 1997. At
first, its efforts were scattered throughout the city.
By the mid-1990s, however, GNHDF began concen-
trating on the Tree Streets neighborhood, construct-
ing affordable rental housing and partnering with
the Police Athletic League to run after-school pro-
grams for the neighborhood’s children.
Nashua’s other nonprofit housing developer, French
Hill Neighborhood Housing Services (FHNHS), was
incorporated in 1991.  It received a NeighborWorks®
charter soon after.  Its target area, French Hill, lay on
the opposite side of the central business district from
the Tree Streets neighborhood.  From the very start,
FHNHS was distinguished from GNHDF less by
geography, however, than by structure and program.  
Unlike GNHDF, which was governed by a self-per-
petuating board, FHNHS was a membership organi-
zation with a majority of its board drawn from, and
elected by, its members. Most of the members were
residents of the French Hill neighborhood.  Unlike
GNHDF, moreover, FHNHS was focused not on
developing rental housing but on rehabilitating
Creating the Conditions
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owner-occupied housing and expanding home own-
ership within its target area.  Three different pro-
grams were established to meet these goals. 
i Home-improvement loan program, providing low-
interest loans to eligible homeowners in French Hill
to rehabilitate their homes; 
i Home-ownership program, providing homebuyer
counseling services and down-payment assistance to
first-time homebuyers; and 
i Purchase, rehab and resell program, in which
problem properties were acquired by FHNHS and
resold to qualified homebuyers.  
An in-house revolving loan fund, with an initial cap-
italization of $40,000 from the Neighborhood Re-
investment Corporation, was established to support
all three programs.  
FHNHS, like Nashua’s other nonprofit housing
agency, started out slowly.  Not until 1993 did it have
its three-person staff in place and its first two pro-
grams up and running.  During the next four years,
FHNHS helped a dozen families buy homes in the
French Hill neighborhood by providing down-pay-
ment assistance; another two dozen homeowners
received home-improvement loans.  F HNHS’s most
productive program, however, was its purchase,
rehab and resale program, which began in 1994.
Between 1994 and 1997, 112 problem properties
were placed in the hands of owner-occupants with
FHNHS’s help.
Although both organizations were well-established
by the mid-1990s and both were having an impact
on improving conditions in their target neighbor-
hoods, these were small-scale operations.  Their ca-
pacity was limited.  Their productivity was modest.
Yet, at the time, this was not unusual in New
Hampshire.  Most of the state’s nonprofit housing
developers had only a few staff members. (See Ap-
pendix K.)  Most were “key-person operations,”
where the loss of a single individual could threaten
the organization’s survival.  Most of the state’s non-
profit developers, moreover, had produced fewer
than a hundred units of affordable housing.  In
Nashua, and elsewhere around the state, these tend-
ed to be small-scale, in-fill projects that were large
enough to put an organization at financial risk if
unsuccessful, but too small to provide a significant
financial return if the project succeeded.  
What was unusual about FHNHS and GNHDF,
when compared with the rest of the state’s nonprofit
housing organizations, however, was the fact that
both existed, side-by-side, in the same city.  A unique
characteristic — and strength — of New Hampshire’s
nonprofit housing delivery system by the mid-1990s
was the geographic labor division that existed
among the state’s dozen nonprofits.  There was nei-
ther functional nor territorial overlap among multi-
ple nonprofits competing for the same projects, con-
stituents and funds — except in Nashua.  Only in
Nashua did two nonprofit housing development
organizations ply their trade in neighborhoods less
than two miles apart.  Only there did two nonprofits
directly compete for public and private dollars to
support their projects and operations.  Only there
did competition result, on occasion, in conflict.  
By 1997, relations between the executive directors of
FHNHS and GNHDF were quite strained.  Tensions
were growing within the two nonprofits as well.
GNHDF had dozens of new units in development,
taxing the capacity of what was essentially a one-
person staff.  At FHNHS, by contrast, productivity
was beginning to fall.  A three-person staff was put-
ting fewer units into production than their one-per-
son competitor across town.  
None of this escaped the attention of the organiza-
tions’ colleagues and funders, who grew increasing-
ly concerned about GNHDF’s capacity, FHNHS’s
productivity and an interorganizational rivalry that
was taking on the appearance of a personal feud.
Among the tight circle of housing professionals
engaged in funding and producing affordable hous-
ing in New Hampshire, there were confidential dis -
cussions about the duplication of services in Nashua
and a quiet, growing worry that two organizations
could simply not be sustained over the long haul.  
These concerns prompted a key funder for both
organizations to consider whether the time had
come, by 1997, to stop supporting two organizations
in Nashua.  The Housing Futures Fund (HFF) had
been established three years earlier under the aus-
pices of the New Hampshire Charitable Foundation
to provide operating support for the state’s fledgling
network of nonprofit housing organizations.
FHNHS and GNHDF were two of the 12 organiza-
tions that regularly received such support.  HFF’s
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advisory committee had abided by a hands-off poli-
cy, electing not to interfere with the internal opera-
tions of its grantees, as long as money was being
well spent and affordable housing was being pro-
duced.  Nevertheless, when F HNHS and GNHDF
submitted their 1997 grant requests, several of the
committee’s members questioned the desirability of
continuing to support two nonprofit housing devel-
opment organizations in Nashua, when every other
region had one. 
Nike Speltz, a foundation official who staffed the
HFF, was asked to pay a visit to Nashua and to as-
sess whether it still made sense to support both
FHNHS and GNHDF. Speltz asked Mike LaFontaine
to join her in this on-site assessment.  He staffed the
New Hampshire Affordable Housing Network, which
had been established about the same time as, and
received most of its funding from, the HFF.
Since much of LaFontaine’s work had involved eval-
uating members’ training needs and, in several
cases, helping ailing members to recover or to
merge with stronger partners, he was a logical
choice. Moreover, all of the state’s nonprofit housing
organizations (including those in Nashua) regarded
both of them as even-handed allies who would not
favor one organization over the other, nor attempt to
substitute their own priorities for those of the net-
work’s members. 
Speltz and La Fontaine visited FHNHS and GNHDF in
m i d - 1 997.  After looking closely at each organization
and at the political environment in which they
worked, they reported back to the HFF advisory com-
mittee that the status quo should be maintained, at
least for the present.  In their opinion, having two
nonprofit housing organizations in Nashua, the state’s
second-largest city, was not unreasonable.  Th ey
operated in separate neighborhoods.  Th ey did differ-
ent kinds of development, for the most part.  Th ey
both had their own political constituencies, inside and
outside of municipal government, who supported
their activities.  Both were achieving a modest-but-
acceptable level of housing production.  It was too
bad that FHNHS ’s productivity was not higher; it wa s
regrettable that GNHDF ’s staff capacity was not
greater; and it was downright troubling that ongoing
tensions between the two organizations occasionally
bubbled into public view.  But neither Speltz nor
La Fontaine were prepared to recommend that HFF
funding be used to nudge FHNHS and GNHDF closer
t o g e t h e r.  Until something changed, the time was not
ripe for preaching cooperation, let alone proposing a
merger between the two organizations.  The advisory
committee accepted this wait-and-see advice and
released the annual operating funds for FHNHS and
GNHDF that had been put on hold.
Rather soon, something did change.  During the ye a r
that followed, Neighborhood Reinvestment began to
raise questions about FHNHS ’s falling productivity,
and FHNHS ’s own board of directors began to raise
questions about the director’s performance.  In partic-
ular, the board’s newly elected president, De b b i e
Miller, voiced her concern that the organization did
not seem to measure up to other members of the
N e i g h b o r Wo r k s® n e t work, a shortcoming she had
noticed while attending out-of-state training programs.
In the fall of 1998, the director for FHNHS finally
resigned.  He had been regarded by many outside
o b s e r vers as having been not only the principal rea-
son for the organization’s poor productivity but also
the principal antagonist in the strained relations with
GNHDF.  Consequently, his departure prompted
m a ny people to begin wondering whether it might
n ow be possible to heal the rift between the two
organizations.  Others went even further, speculating
whether the time might have finally arrived to begin
considering a FHNHS/ GNHDF merger.  Nobody out-
side of the two organizations wanted to speak prema-
turely or to act precipitously, however, in pushing
this possibility.  Nobody wanted to squander what
seemed to be a golden opportunity for cooperation or
consolidation by antagonizing the staff or boards of
t wo very independent organizations.  
For a short while after the director’s departure,
therefore, everybody stood respectfully on the side-
lines, holding their breath, hoping that someone
might take the lead in bringing these organizations
together.  They did not have long to wait. i
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E x p l o rat i o n
I
t was Debbie Miller, the new president of the
FHNHS board, who took the first tentative step.
A couple of months after the departure of her
organization’s director, she arranged a meeting
with Bridgett Beldon-Jette, GNHDF’s director, to ask
about the chances of FHNHS and GNHDF working
more closely together — perhaps even merging.  
Encouraged by Beldon-Jette’s favorable response,
she then approached Nike Speltz and Mike LaFon-
taine to request their assistance in convening a
meeting to discuss this possibility.  She understood
that a neutral party would be needed to host such a
meeting, so she turned to two people who she
believed both organizations knew and trusted. 
They moved quickly, gathering together a small
group of people from F HNHS and GNHDF in Febru-
ary 1999.  The expectations for this meeting were
modest, at least in the minds of Speltz and LaFon-
taine.  They hoped merely to begin a dialogue that
might reduce the tensions between the two organi-
zations and engender a desire to explore some sort
of future collaboration. They discovered, however,
somewhat to their surprise, that none of the individ-
uals invited to this first meeting had any antagonism
toward the organization that had long been compet-
ing, and fighting, with their own.  The past conflict
had occurred at the level of the executive directors.
Very little had filtered through to either board.  
As a result, the board members who attended this
first meeting arrived with no scars from earlier bat-
tles.  They carried no emotional baggage predispos-
ing them to regard their counterparts from the other
board with suspicion or disfavor.  Even more sur-
prising, they arrived at this meeting predisposed to-
ward collaboration.  To say that they had already
“merged in their minds,” as one participant later
claimed, is probably an exaggeration.  Yet it was
obvious to all attendees that merger was more than
merely one option among many for drawing the
organizations closer together.  It was the preferred
option of most of the people who were there.  
It was decided that another meeting should be held
to discuss this possibility.  A conscious effort was
made to broaden participation, bringing key people
from each organization into the discussion: three
members of the G NHDF board were invited, along
with GNHDF’s executive director.  Representing
FHNHS were Debbie Miller and three other board
members. Also invited were three representatives
from the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation:
LaRayne Hebert, field representative for the New
Hampshire affiliates (including FHNHS); Nelson
Merced, the newly named director for Neighborhood
Reinvestment’s district office in Boston; and Ken
Wade, the soon-to-leave district director. LaFontaine
and Speltz rounded out the list of attendees.  
This meeting was held on March 16, 1999.  It wa s
assumed, from the start, that a merger of FHNHS and
GNHDF was worth pursuing.  That is not to say that
a nyone knew what form a merger of these two organi-
zations might take, nor that eve r yone was entirely
c o nvinced that the interests of all parties could actual-
ly be met through a merger.  Indeed, at a key point
during the discussion, a senior member of the FHNHS
board questioned the assumption that consolidating
the functions of the two organizations must necessari-
ly entail eliminating the distinctions between them.
She asked, “Couldn’t some way be found to preserve
the identities of the two organizations?”  
Her question was answered with two others. What
functions were distinct to each organization, and
what aspects of each organization’s identity should
be preserved?  The representatives from GNHDF
described their primary function as developing
affordable rental housing.  What was unique about
their organizational identity, they stressed, was the
geographic commitment to Nashua’s Tree Streets
neighborhood and the programmatic commitment to
the permanent affordability of any housing they
developed.  
FHNHS, for its part, stressed its commitment to
home ownership for low-income people and the
active participation of residents from its target
neighborhood, French Hill.  They extolled the
advantages, as well, of being a NeighborWorks® affil-
iate. This raised another question: Would
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation support a
merger of FHNHS and GNHDF and, if one could be
accomplished, would the new organization be grant-
ed a NeighborWorks® charter?  
Assessing the Potential
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Neighborhood Reinvestment representatives made a
presentation describing the NeighborWorks® net-
work and the membership requirements.  They
noted that several nonprofit mergers had occurred
in New England in recent years, some of them
involving NeighborWorks® network members. The
most recent was Manchester Neighborhood Housing
Services in nearby Manchester, New Hampshire.  
Neighborhood Reinvestment representatives stated
that they would support any efforts to merge FHNHS
and GNHDF, including paying for someone to help
facilitate discussion among the parties.  
The Corporation’s district director, Ken Wade, men-
tioned the name of John Davis, a consultant who
had just completed the merger of two nonprofits in
central Vermont, one of them a Neighborhood
Housing Services organization similar to FHNHS.
The Corporation’s representatives were quick to cau-
tion, however, that there was no guarantee that the
organization resulting from the merger of FHNHS
and GNHDF would meet the guidelines for Neigh-
borWorks® affiliation.  There was no precedent,
moreover, for a charter being transferred.  Just
because FHNHS was a NeighborWorks® network
member did not guarantee that a postmerger succes-
sor would be one. 
Despite these words of warning, though, the repre-
sentatives were quite encouraging.  They conveyed
support for a possible merger, described the stan-
dards a postmerger organization would have to meet
to qualify for membership in the NeighborWorks®
network, and then stepped respectfully into the
background.  They made it clear — by their words
and, later, by their actions — that Neighborhood
Reinvestment would not attempt to dictate either the
pace of the merger process or the form and content
of whatever organizational products might emerge
from it.
One final issue was raised before the meeting
adjourned.  The director of the Nashua Housing
Authority, who was attending in his role as an ex-
officio member of the GNHDF board, suggested
there might be an opportunity here to expand the
geographic area served by Nashua’s nonprofits.  He
warned that the pool of eligible, creditworthy house-
holds was eventually going to become shallow and
that the number of affordable, buildable sites in
French Hill and the Tree Streets neighborhoods were
going to become more scarce.  A merger of FHNHS
and GNHDF, in his opinion, presented a perfect
opportunity to extend the range of nonprofit housing
activity to include not only the neighborhoods sur-
rounding French Hill and the Tree Streets, but other
towns and communities surrounding Nashua.  
After an hour-and-a-half, the meeting ended with
agreement that this exploratory discussion should
continue.  Another meeting of the same ad hoc com-
mittee was scheduled for 10 days later. LaFontaine
volunteered to prepare an agenda to clarify issues
that would need to be resolved for a merger of
FHNHS/GNHDF to proceed.  He also volunteered to
act as the meeting’s facilitator.
LaFontaine’s preparation for the upcoming meeting
was extensive.  He had conversations with Debbie
Miller and Bridgette Belton-Jette.  He met with Nike
Speltz at the New Hampshire Charitable Founda-
tion.  He phoned LaRayne Hebert at Neighborhood
Reinvestment.  He prepared a draft agenda and sent
a copy to John Davis, the Vermont consultant who
Ken Wade had mentioned.  
Two years before, LaFontaine and Davis had worked
together on a strategic assessment of New Hamp-
shire’s nonprofit affordable housing network, an
assessment that had included both FHNHS and
GNHDF.  Since Davis was familiar with the players
in Nashua and had recently completed a couple of
nonprofit mergers in other states, LaFontaine was
interested in having his former colleague look over
his proposed plan for structuring the exploratory
committee’s next meeting.  They spoke by phone the
day before, with Davis assuring LaFontaine that his
proposed agenda looked fine.  
The meeting on March 26 opened with a discussion
of pros, cons, concerns and hopeful signs — and
ended with these results.
PROS
- More effective pursuit of mission
- Use resources more efficiently
- Each brings skills and experiences that the other 
values or lacks 
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- Strengths of each protect the other’s vulnerabilities
- United political front to city government
- Strong, positive message to funders
- Joint energies (Each organization can draw strength 
from the other.)
CONS
- Initial loss of productivity (?)
- Ongoing investment of energy into relationship
- Failure will cost lost time and energy
CONCERNS
- Potential loss of identity
- Governance (board composition and decision-making)
- Will the expansion to surrounding communities dilute   
organizational effectiveness?
HOPEFUL SIGNS
- Acting from strength and vision, not weakness
- Missions and technical strengths complement each other 
- Each already plans to expand into areas the other brings   
into the relationship
- Neighborhood Reinvestment resources and the founda-  
tion’s property inventory establishes new entity as serious 
player
- Alternative of separate growth, competition poses even 
greater risk to $$
- Technical barriers to merger are small: assets, systems, 
complementary programs and staff
- Mutual respect
THINGS WE MUST WORK ON
- Who do we want to serve (mission)?
- How do we want to make decisions (board composition; 
decision-making process)?
- What guidelines will we use for allocating resources (pro-
gram priorities)?
- What will we call ourselves?
- What interim arrangements should we make to accom-
modate something less than a complete success?
Several items on this list are noteworthy.  First of all,
the underlying assumption of this discussion was
that the merger of F HNHS and GNHDF was the ulti-
mate goal.  Other forms of collaboration were not 
even on the table.  Second, merger was not per-
ceived as purely a defensive move, designed to pro-
tect organizational funding or to shore up weakness-
es in the two organizations.  Merger was also being
discussed, even at this early stage, as an opportunity
to expand programming and geography.  Third, gov-
ernance loomed large in the minds of the commit-
tee’s members as they looked ahead toward a
merged organization.  What would be the composi-
tion of the new board of directors?  How would key
decisions be made regarding resource allocation,
program priorities and the like? Loss of control and
loss of identity were the committee’s paramount
concerns.  
Also to be found in this list is a prudent assessment
of the cost of merger, acknowledging that short-term
productivity might be traded for long-term effective-
ness and efficiency.  Just as notable is the mention of
interim arrangements, an acknowledgment that the
merger of FHNHS and GNHDF might prove more
difficult and take more time than anticipated.
Something less than a consummated merger but
something more than the current separation of the
two organizations might be needed as a temporary,
transitional step toward eventual consolidation.
Just as notable is what was missing from their list of
concerns.  Focused resolutely on accentuating the
p o s i t i ve, the committee made no mention of we a k-
nesses existing in either organization that might delay
or jeopardize the contemplated merger.  Most striking
is the absence of such potentially divisive issues as
staffing and locating the merged organization.  
Having completed this exercise, the committee
turned its attention toward the mission of the
merged organization.  It believed that reaching con-
sensus on a mission statement would provide a good
foundation for the process of blending the two
organizations. Beth Raymond, one of the participants
and a GNHDF board member, had recently endured
a lengthy process of merging two social service
organizations. She counseled her colleagues that
“the mission statement is the most important ele-
ment in the process; if that mission statement can be
determined, then everything else will fall into place.”
LaFontaine divided the committee into two equal
groups of six members.  Each group was asked to
spend 20 minutes brainstorming about the elements
that the mission statement of a merged organization
should contain. When the two groups reconvened,
their lists were compared.  
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Group One had listed the following items:
1. Partnership
2. Neighborhood revitalization
3. Quality and affordability
4. Pride
5. Better use of resources (money, people, 
expertise, efficiency and advocacy)
6. Strong commitment to both neighborhoods 
(Tree Streets and French Hill)
7. Community organizing
8. Family stability
9. Self-sufficiency
The list generated by Group Two looked similar but
included two additional items.  This group believed
that any new mission statement should include a
commitment to extending the organization’s geo-
graphic base beyond Nashua, as well as a commit -
ment to advocating for affordable housing.  The
whole committee agreed that these elements should
be included in the final mission statement. The com-
mittee then adjourned, with the participants agree-
ing to meet again in a couple of weeks.
The day before the next meeting, LaRayne Hebert
from Neighborhood Reinvestment arranged a con-
ference call that included Debbie Miller (FHNHS
president), Bridgett Belton-Jette (GNHDF director),
Mike LaFontaine, John Davis and herself. The pur-
pose was to outline the next steps in the merger
process and to discuss the resources needed to move
it forward. 
Hebert reported that Neighborhood Reinvestment
and the New Hampshire Charitable Foundation were
prepared to split the cost of bringing Davis into the
merger process to guide the negotiations between
FHNHS and GNHDF.  Assuming that Davis was
acceptable to the exploratory committee and that the
organizations’ boards agreed to proceed with merger
talks, Hebert suggested the next phases in the
process: design a working model of the new organi-
zation and perform a due-diligence review of the
financial and programmatic operations of both
organizations.  Upon completion of these tasks,
hopefully capped by an affirmative vote of both
boards to merge, she envisioned a six-month to 12-
month transition period of gradually combining the
operations of the two organizations.  
Although Davis might be called upon to facilitate
this final phase of the merger, Hebert suggested that
a consultant closer to hand might be better at that
point.  With funding from the Corporation, F HNHS
had been ready to hire Carolyn Benthien, a New
Hampshire organizational development consultant
(former head of United Way in Manchester), to assist
with its strategic planning.  When the possibility of a
merger with GNHDF arose, this consulting contract
had been put on hold. Hebert now sketched out a
plan for completing the merger that included Davis
as the phase-two facilitator and Benthien as the
phase-three facilitator.
Davis chimed in to say that he agreed with Hebert’s
assessment.  He expressed an interest in participat-
ing in the negotiation phase of the merger process, if
invited to do so. Once the terms of the merger were
settled, however, he believed that it would make
more sense for someone who was physically closer
to Nashua to serve as facilitator, coach and day-to-
day troubleshooter during the period of blending
together the staffs and operations of FHNHS and
GNHDF.
The other participants on the conference call agreed
that this two-step plan, building upon the explorato-
ry talks scheduled to resume the following day, was
a reasonable way to proceed.  They also liked the
idea of having different facilitators for the next two
phases.  
GNHDF’s executive director, however, voiced her
concern that hers was essentially a one-person op-
eration and that she was already overwhelmed by
projects that were moving rapidly through the orga-
nization’s development pipeline.  She was happy to
participate in discussions about a possible merger
and, having met Davis two years before, was recep-
tive to his involvement.  But she declared that she
did not have enough slack in her schedule to pull
files, generate reports or deal with any sort of due-
diligence review of her operations.  
She was offered assurances by the other participants
in the conference call that Davis’ role would extend
beyond facilitation to include preparation of any
comparisons, budgets or reports that the merger
committee might need to do its work.  Any due-dili-
gence review of her organization and operations,
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moreover, would be done after the building season
was over, at a time when the pressures on her time
were less.  More importantly, due diligence would
not be done until after the decision was made to
make the proposed merger a reality.
The next day, the committee met under LaFontaine’s
guidance for the last time. They presented the plan
discussed during the conference call to move for-
ward with the merger to Debbie Miller and LaRayne
Hebert.  There was general agreement that the plan
looked good and should be presented to both boards.
The committee also agreed that, on the basis of
Neighborhood Reinvestment’s recommendation and
LaFontaine’s endorsement, the consultant from
Vermont should be asked to facilitate the next phase
of the merger talks.  
Committee members had planned to discuss issues
of governance and program congruence, but little
time remained after hashing out the next steps in
the merger process.  Nevertheless, they did spend a
few minutes reviewing these topics.  No in-depth
discussion or preliminary decision was possible, but
LaFontaine believed that even a quick-brush consid-
eration was worthwhile.  Anticipating the negotia-
tions to come, he wanted to see what controversies
or conflicts might lurk beneath the surface.  What he
and the committee discovered, on the topic of gover-
nance, was easy acceptance of the notion of a single
board for a consolidated organization, but a diversity
of opinion about the composition and selection of
that consolidated board.  
By contrast, there was unanimity on the topic of the
fit between the programs of FHNHS and those of
GNHDF.  It seemed obvious to members of the com-
mittee that the programs of both organizations were
worth retaining and should just be blended together
in a consolidated organization.  This postmerger
entity would carry out the same home-ownership
programs that had long been administered by
FHNHS and develop the same kinds of the rental
housing projects that had long been undertaken by
GNHDF.  No problem was apparent in combining
these programmatic activities.
One final task needed to be completed to conclude
this exploratory phase. John Davis, the facilitator of
the next phase of the process, insisted that the
boards of both organizations adopt a formal resolu-
tion, embracing the notion of a possible FHNHS/
GNHDF merger.  More importantly, he wanted an
explicit delegation of authority from both boards,
allowing their representatives to negotiate the terms
of such a merger.  Jointly drafted by LaFontaine and
Davis during the middle of May, a resolution was
presented to both boards in June.  It read as follows. 
RESOLVED that the board of ______ votes to
approve the comprehensive and systematic explo-
ration of merger with ____, with the goal of effecting
a merger with _____ in the event that the results of
this review confirm the desirability of such a merger
to the satisfaction of the Board; and 
That the Chair of the Board and the Executive
Director are authorized to take such actions as may
be reasonably necessary to conduct such explo-
ration; and 
That if it appears that merger should be formally
considered, the executive director is charged with
responsibility for drafting, together with his/her
counterpart at ___, a Memorandum of
Understanding for final review and decision by the
board.
The resolution was approved after much discussion
but little dissent by each board.  Negotiations could
now begin. i
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N ego t i at i o n
Planning the Merger
T
he first meeting of the newly constituted
FHNHS/ GNHDF merger committee
occurred on May 28, 1999.  This nine-
person committee included six represen-
t a t i ves from the organizations’ boards (three from
FHNHS and three from GNHDF), a local attorney
who was a member of both boards, GNHDF ex e c-
u t i ve director, and the FHNHS ’s interim director,
who was hired with Neighborhood Reinve s t m e n t ’s
assistance soon after the original ex e c u t i ve direc-
t o r ’s departure.  Two other individuals partici-
pated in this and subsequent meetings as nonvo t-
ing resource people, the Affordable Housing Net-
wo r k ’s Mike La Fontaine and Neighborhood
R e i nvestment Co r p o r a t i o n ’s La R ayne Hebert.  
The outside consultant who had been hired to
facilitate this second phase of the merger process,
John Davis, was also in attendance.  Before this
point, few members of the merger committee had
ever met Davis face-to-face, so introductions we r e
in order.  This was an opportunity, as well, for new
committee members to be introduced to each other
and for every member to voice his or her ex p e c t a-
tions (and reservations) about the process about to
begin.  Going around the table, each person spoke
to the desirability of the two organizations becom-
ing one, although several seemed to assume that
their organization would ultimately be the sole
s u r v i vor, absorbing the assets and the staff of the
o t h e r.  One held out a lingering hope that collabo-
ration might somehow be achieved without either
organization losing its separate corporate identity.  
Davis then proposed that the committee’s first
tasks should be to clarify his role in the upcoming
process and to decide the committee’s own role
and rules. He offered to play as active or passive a
role as the committee might prefer.  At one end of
the continuum of possibilities, his invo l ve m e n t
might be limited merely to facilitating the commit-
t e e ’s forthcoming meetings.  At the other end, he
might play a more directive role, not only facilitat-
ing meetings but designing the overall process,
setting each meeting’s agenda, moving the agenda,
preparing comparisons and budgets as an aid to
decision-making, and summarizing the commit-
t e e ’s decisions.  
The advantages and disadvantages of these two
extremes were considered, along with a few alter-
n a t i ves in between.  In the end, the committee
decided that Davis should play as active, directive
a role as possible, provided that the New
Hampshire Charitable Foundation and
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation we r e
willing to pay for his services.  Some concern wa s
expressed, however, about his ability to facilitate
meetings while recording the committee’s discus-
sions and decisions. La Fontaine stepped forward to
suggest that he might play the latter role.  He pro-
posed serving as the committee’s scribe with the
understanding that Hebert would fill in for him
w h e n ever he was absent.  The rough notes that
were taken during each meeting would be passed
along to Davis for refinement and distribution.  His
offer was quickly accepted.  The merger committee
was now ready to begin.
Committee Role and Ru l e s
Turning to their own role in the merger process, the
committee made several key decisions regarding
who they were and how they would operate in the
months ahead.  First, members clarified for them-
s e l ves that their collective role was to be advisory
o n l y.  Ultimate authority for deciding whether to
m ove toward merger would continue to reside with
their respective boards.  Th ey insisted, in fact, that
the outcomes of the committee’s deliberations, when-
ever consensus was reached, should be character-
ized as a recommendation, not a decision. Their rec-
ommendations would be submitted to each board for
consideration.  Only after a recommendation wa s
r ev i ewed and approved by both boards could it be
characterized as a decision. 
Second, the committee set the basic parameters for
its own composition and operation.  Wishing to en-
sure continuity, progress and confidentiality, they
limited the committee’s membership to those indi-
viduals who were already in the room, while secur-
ing a commitment from all who were there to see the
process through to the very end.  Th ey did not wa n t
people coming and going throughout their process,
making it necessary to update newcomers and to
r evisit issues again and again.  At the same time,
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t h ey anticipated that other persons might be needed
when specific topics came up for discussion and
might be invited to participate in the committee’s dis-
cussions.  Members of the committee agreed, howev-
er, that the committee as a whole would discuss and
a p p r ove such invitations before they were extended.  
The committee also agreed that consensus wo u l d
guide their decision-making (or, more accurately,
their recommendations).  This rigorous decision rule
was made less daunting by the committee’s under-
standing that individuals would not stand in the way
of recommendations that seemed to represent the
“sense of the meeting.”  Even if someone could not
personally endorse every detail of a recommenda-
tion, he or she would be willing to support it, and
send it on to both boards for discussion and decision.
Finally, the committee tackled the difficult issue of
c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y.  Members wanted the time and space
to reach their own conclusions about making and
managing a merger of FHNHS and GNHDF.  Th ey
recognized they would need a degree of privacy to
test new ideas and to test each other, feeling their
way toward consensus. Th ey also recognized that
m a ny outside parties were going to be very interested
in what the committee was doing. This wo u l d
include, for example, FHNHS and GNHDF board
members who had not been appointed to the merger
committee, staff members other than the ex e c u t i ve
directors, public and private funders for the two
organizations, members of FHNHS, and members of
the general public.  
Attempting to balance their own desire for priva c y
with the demand of other parties to be appraised of
the progress being made, the committee decided that
public information about the possible merger wo u l d
be limited solely to an acknowledgment that merger
talks were underway.  Reports to each board wo u l d
consist of lists of topics being discussed and the
schedule for considering them.  The recommenda-
tions adopted by the committee would be presented
to each board, in a complete and uniform format,
only after the committee finished discussing all of the
issues before it.  With these procedural questions
behind them, the committee’s members turned their
attention to defining the scope of work before them.
Tasks and T i m e l i n e
Acting immediately on the committee’s preference
for a proactive, directive facilitator, Davis laid out a
t e n t a t i ve plan for negotiating the terms of a possible
FHNHS/ GNHDF merger.  Based on his prev i o u s
experience with similar mergers, Davis had drafted a
“ Proposed Sequence of Events,” describing the tasks
that the merger committee would need to perform,
the tasks that others (including Davis) would need to
perform, and the order in which these tasks should
be tackled. (See Appendix B: Proposed Sequence of
Events.)  
He proposed a series of meetings in which the com-
mittee would attempt to reach consensus, first, on the
purpose and programs of a consolidated organiza-
tion; then, on the structure of the organization; and,
finally, on various operational issues such as staffing,
locating and funding the organization.  Davis asked
the committee’s members to commit to a minimum
of five meetings, while warning that more wo u l d
probably be required.  After considerable discussion,
the committee adopted this blueprint for their future
deliberations.  The committee’s members then pulled
out their calendars and promptly scheduled the nex t
f i ve meetings.  
M i s s i o n
Earlier discussions of the mission and purposes of a
merged FHNHS/ GNHDF, occurring during the
exploratory phase, allowed a quick resolution of this
issue when the committee gathered for its second
meeting on June 18.  Resolving this issue was also
made easy by the fact that the present missions of the
t wo organizations were so similar. (See Appendix C:
Comparison of Purposes and Programs.)  Both we r e
committed to a dual mission of providing affordable
housing and promoting neighborhood rev i t a l i z a t i o n .
Both endorsed the concept of working in partnership
with government and business to achieve these
goals.  
Their missions diverged only in three significant
respects.  The FHNHS service area was confined to a
single neighborhood, while GNHDF was open to
serving Nashua and surrounding communities,
despite its recent emphasis on the Tree Streets neigh-
borhood.  Secondly, FHNHS directed its housing
d evelopment efforts toward home ownership and
housing rehabilitation, while GNHDF focused on
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rental housing and the new construction.  (Neither of
these priorities was actually spelled out in the ar-
ticles or b y l aws of either organization. It was simply
understood by ev e r yone that this was what each
organization did.)  Third, GNHDF was committed to
fulfilling the housing portion of its corporate mission
through the development of permanently affordable
housing. FHNHS had never made a comparable
commitment, either in its mission or its programs,
h aving made a conscious choice not to limit whatev-
er equity gains homeowners might realize upon
resale of their homes.  
To bridge some of the distance between the two mis-
sion statements, three words were added to GNHD F Õ s
long-time mission statement.  The committee pro-
posed that the mission of the merged organization
should read as follows (their added words are high-
l i g h t e d ) .
Ò T he mission of ___________________ is to work in
cooperation with other public and private enterprises
to develop and preserve affordable housing and pro-
mote the social welfare of persons in Nashua, New
Hampshire, and surrounding communities in order
to accomplish three goals:
u Assist very low, low and moderate-income families
and individuals in achieving economic self-sufficien-
cy and family stability through permanently afford-
able rental housing and home ow n e r s h i p .
u E m p ower residents to become invo l ved in the solu-
tion to their housing and neighborhood needs.
u R evitalize ove r c r owded, substandard and unsafe
housing and promote neighborhood improve m e n t
and stability.”
In recommending this mission statement, the com-
mittee reaffirmed its belief that the merged organiza-
tion should do both affordable housing deve l o p m e n t
and neighborhood revitalization, while making
explicit a commitment to developing both rental
housing and owner-occupied housing.  
By contrast, the committee had no desire to make
explicit its position on the potentially divisive issue of
permanent affordability.  It finessed this issue by
placing the modifying phrase “permanently afford-
able” immediately before “rental housing.”  Such an
arrangement of phrases allows one to construe the
commitment to permanent affordability as applying
either to rental housing alone or to all of the housing
to be developed by the merged organization, rental
and home ownership alike.  At this early stage in its
deliberations, the committee found refuge in such
ambiguity, leaving a more focused discussion of per-
manent affordability until later.  
S e rvice A re a
During its discussion of mission, the committee
touched on the question of what area the merged
organization should serve.  Th ey quickly and easily
agreed that Nashua and its surrounding communities
should be the service area named in the organiza-
t i o n ’s mission statement, but nobody was too clear
about what this actually meant.  When the discus-
sion finally got around to defining the service area
more exactly, during their second and third meet-
ings, the committee members discovered they had
very different ideas about how ex t e n s i ve this area
should be and how intensively the organization’s
services should be targeted.  
To make progress on topic, the committee divided
the question and distinguished two different geo-
graphic targets. The committee’s facilitator character-
ized these as an organization’s “zone of opportunity”
versus its “zone of priority.”  Focusing on the first,
there was quick consensus among the committee’s
members that the city of Nashua should be the cen-
ter of the service area, but no agreement on how far
afield to go in embracing Nashua’s "surrounding
communities." Some members were reluctant to
name these communities with any specificity or to
define an outer boundary for the organization’s activ-
ities at all.  
B e t ween meetings two and three, one of GNHDF ’s
r e p r e s e n t a t i ves prepared a map of southeast New
Hampshire, showing the towns surrounding Nashua.
This helped the committee’s members to visualize
h ow large an area might be both operationally prac-
tical and politically expedient.  Th ey finally rec-
ommended a service area that would include the
surrounding communities of Brookline, Milford,
Amherst, Hollis, Merrimack, Litchfield and Hudson —
an area stretching beyond Nashua by approx i m a t e l y
a dozen miles.  These particular communities we r e
chosen on the basis of three criteria: their need for
affordable housing; the availability of reasonably
priced development sites; and the likelihood of
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acceptance and support of affordable housing deve l-
opment by town officials.  
While it was envisioned that the merged organization
would offer homebuyer services and pursue op-por-
tunities for housing development throughout the
Greater Nashua region, the neighborhood rev i t a l i -
zation component of the mission made it necessary
to designate priority zones within this regional serv-
ice area.  The committee recommended targeting two
areas for neighborhood revitalization: the French Hill
neighborhood, which FHNHS had prioritized since
its inception; and the Tree Streets neighborhood,
which GNHDF had prioritized for five years.  In
future years, the committee went on to say, new tar-
get area(s) might be added, depending upon the
availability of additional resources; the impact on
existing revitalization commitments; the degree of
need in the proposed area; and the likelihood of sub-
stantial, positive impact.  For the immediate future,
h owever, the committee believed that it was impor-
tant for the merged organization to keep faith with
those neighborhoods in which FHNHS and GNHDF
had long been working.  Only the French Hill and
Tree Streets neighborhoods would be proposed as the
areas in which the merged organization should focus
its activities.
B e n e f i c i a r i e s
The committee acknowledged the importance of
reassuring the residents of these two neighborhoods
that they would not be abandoned as a result of the
m e r g e r. The committee also acknowledged the im-
portance of reassuring their primary funders, public
and private, that the merger would not result in a
reduction in services for the populations presently
s e r ved by FHNHS and GNHDF.  
This presented a problem for the merger committee
because a wide discrepancy presently existed be-
t ween the upper income limits for the beneficiaries
of FHNHS and those of GNHDF.  For rental housing,
FHNHS had an upper limit of 80 percent of median;
GNHDF had an upper limit of only 60 percent of
median. For owner-occupied housing (which
GNHDF did not do), FHNHS had an upper limit of
1 40 percent of median for dow n - p ayment loans and
rehabilitation loans and an 80 percent limit for
h o m e b u yer purchases of units developed by FHNHS.  
Representatives for GNHDF, in reviewing the higher
limits allowed by FHNHS, worried that their or-
ganization’s historic preference for serving very low-
income households might get diluted or ignored
should the postmerger organization adopt FHNHS’s
guidelines.  Representatives for FHNHS worried that
their own priority for promoting and assisting
owner-occupied housing might be rendered close to
impossible should the postmerger organization
focus exclusively on serving households below 60
percent of median (households too poor to afford
home ownership).  
Looking for a compromise on this issue, the commit-
tee endorsed FHNHS ’s upper income limit of 80 per-
cent for the occupancy of rental units developed by
the nonprofit but declared that the merged organiza-
t i o n ’s priority should be to target “the lowest possible
income level supportable by the project.”  Similarly,
FHNHS ’s upper income limits for ow n e r - o c c u p i e d
housing were endorsed, again with the condition that
each and every program should be targeted as low as
possible, contingent upon available funding.  (See
Appendix D: Recommended Beneficiaries for the
Merged Organization.) 
P rogra m s
After rev i ewing the full array of products and services
presently offered by FHNHS and GNHDF, the com-
mittee recommended keeping them all.  The highest
priority, in the committee’s mind, was to equalize
services between the two target neighborhoods.
Consequently, the committee recommended that the
merged organization move as quickly as possible to
p r ovide French Hill residents with all of the products
and services that GNHDF had long offered in the Tr e e
Streets neighborhood.  Li k ewise, the merged organiza-
tion should move as quickly as possible to provide in
the Tree Streets neighborhood all of the products and
services that FHNHS had long offered in French Hill.  
The committee then brainstormed a list of projects
and programs that might be added to the activities
of a merged organization, including the follow i n g
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
i Support services for residents of housing deve l o p e d
by the nonprofit, coordinating services available from
other agencies;
i Community organizing in target neighborhoods
(i.e., French Hill and the Tree Streets);
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i Expanded housing-development capacity, either
internal to the merged organization (i.e., internally
staffed) or employing outside consultants (contracted
as needed); 
i Acquisition of “expiring-use properties” (i.e., subsi-
dized housing that would otherwise be lost to the
market); 
i Enhanced advocacy for affordable housing, includ-
ing the need for an expanded Spanish language capa-
bility within the organization's staff and within its
written materials; and 
i Expanded capacity to do fundraising for projects
and operations.
Although clearly a “wish list” that would heav i l y
depend on finding new funding and adding new staff,
the time the committee spent generating this list wa s
hardly wasted.  Not only was this discussion a we l-
come relief from more pedestrian, picayune tasks
like defining service areas, beneficiaries and the like,
it was an energy boost for the committee to “think
b i g .”  Th ey got excited about how much more a
merged organization might accomplish than either
FHNHS or GNHDF had heretofore been able to do.  
Pe rmanent A ffo rd ab i l i t y
By the end of their third meeting, members of the
merger committee were ready to confront the issue
t h ey had glossed over during their earlier discussion
of the mission of the merged organization: whether
all of the housing developed in the future should be
permanently affordable.  GNHDF, a developer of
rental housing, had institutionalized a commitment to
permanent affordability by inserting it into the orga-
n i z a t i o n ’s by l aws.  FHNHS, primarily a developer of
owner-occupied housing, had never embraced per-
manent affordability but had imposed affordability
controls when required to do so by outside funders.
The ensuing debate weighed a policy preference for
preserving and recycling scarce subsidies against a
programmatic preference for retaining flex i b i l i t y.  
After a spirited discussion, the committee recom-
mended the following affordability policy for the
merged organization.
i All rental housing under the organization's ow n e r-
ship or control would remain permanently affordable.
i Owner-occupied housing, either assisted or deve l-
oped by the merged organization, would be encum-
bered by varying degrees of subsidy retention or sub-
sidy recapture, as determined by the requirements of
a ny outside funders providing the subsidy.  
i In the absence of an outside funder’s retention or
recapture conditions, the merged organization wo u l d
seek to retain affordability for successive generations
of homeowners.  The rule of thumb used by the
merged organization would be as follows: the larger
the financial subsidy put into making a home afford-
able, the stronger would be the merged organization's
interest in retaining affordability over time.  Th i s
would be decided on a case-by-case and a project-by -
project basis, however, taking into consideration what
might be best for the target population as a whole, for
the current homeowner, and for the neighborhood in
which the housing is located.
B o a rd of D i re c t o rs
Not unexpectedly, more time was spent debating the
composition and selection of the merged organi-
z a t i o n ’s board of directors than was devoted to any
other topic during phase two.  This debate consumed
the better part of the fourth and fifth meetings. 
Committee members reached ready agreement on
s everal general principles, which later made it easier
to negotiate the more difficult details of how the new
o r g a n i z a t i o n ’s board should be structured.  Th ey
agreed on the following. 
i Residents should be represented on the new board; 
i Residents from the French Hill and Tree Streets
neighborhoods, in particular, should be represented
on the new board;
i There should be a mix of resident representative s
and nonresident representatives; and 
i The merged organization’s board should conform
to Neighborhood Reinvestment Co r p o r a t i o n ’s mini-
mum requirement of 51 percent resident representa-
tion to allow NeighborWo r k s® affiliation by the new
e n t i t y.  
At this point in the committee’s deliberations,
Neighborhood Reinve s t m e n t ’s representative, who
had remained respectfully in the background during
the earlier discussions, was called upon to play a
more active role. The committee wanted her to clari-
fy what the Corporation would actually require in the
way of resident representation. 
Hebert noted that the definition of “resident” requires
either that (a) a person, regardless of income, live s
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(or owns a business) within the organization’s target
area or (b) lives within the organization’s service
area and is a direct beneficiary of one or more of the
programs offered by the organization.  A beneficiary
who uses one or more of these programs and later
m oves out of the service area would cease to be eligi-
ble for the board.  
No one believed this standard would be hard to meet,
g i ven the committee’s commitment to two target
areas (the French Hill and the Tree Streets neighbor-
hoods) and to a broader service area. The committee
reaffirmed, therefore, that the new board should have
majority representation from residents.  Further, they
recommended that there be equal representation
from the two target neighborhoods and at least one
resident seat reserved for someone living outside of
either neighborhood.  
Agreement on the nonresident portion of the new
board was more difficult to reach.  Here is where the
different structures of FHNHS and GNHDF and the
different experiences of the representatives from the
t wo organizations came to the fore. (See Appendix E:
Comparison of Organizational Structures.) The rep-
r e s e n t a t i ves from FHNHS were used to residents
being in charge, accompanied by minimal represen-
tation from banking and government (as per the
Co r p o r a t i o n ’s requirements).  The representative s
from GNHDF were accustomed to a board composed
entirely of individuals from the business sector, gov-
ernment and nonprofit organizations with little (or
no) resident representation.  
Because they came from such different ex p e r i e n c e s ,
committee members had very different ideas about
the number and kind of business representatives that
should be added to the board and whether any seats
should be reserved for representatives from nonprofit
or religious organizations (which were heavily repre-
sented on the GNHDF board).  In the case of gove r n-
ment representation, there was considerable debate
over whether seats should be reserved for elected or
nonelected public officials and whether these offi-
cials should come from the municipal or state leve l .
In the end, the committee finally agreed on the fol-
l ow i n g .
i Seats should be reserved for nonelected gove r n-
ment representatives, serving at either the municipal
or state level. The committee noted the desirability of
h aving the city of Nashua represented on the board
of directors and the prudence of consulting with
Nashua's mayor before any seat might be offered to a
city official. However, members decided not to for-
malize these preferences or to write them into the
by l aws of the new organization.  
i Seats should be reserved for business representa-
t i ves, with at least one of these seats filled by some-
one from a private financial institution and at least
one of these seats filled by an attorney.
i Seats designated for government and business
interests should not be more specifically identified.
That is, no particular governmental entity, depart-
ment, or office or any particular business entity,
industry or association should be entitled to repre-
sentation. 
i The nonprofit sector (e.g., social service agencies,
other nonprofit housing providers, religious institu-
tions, etc.) should not be specifically represented on
the board of directors, unlike the representation
already recommended for the public sector and the
business sector.  
i Nonresident representatives (government and
business) should be nominated by the nominating
committee and approved by the board of directors of
the merged organization.  No outside agency or insti-
tution should be given the power to name represen-
t a t i ves to the board.  
Dr awing upon the consensus they had reached
regarding resident and nonresident representation,
committee members were ready at last to begin
assigning specific numbers to the categories of seats
t h ey were intent on reserving for particular interests.
With large pieces of newsprint taped to the walls and
Davis alternately jotting down numbers with multi-
colored markers and then crossing them out as com-
mittee members voiced their preferences and
changed their minds, they inched their way towa r d
agreement.  Th ey settled on a 17-member board of
directors for the merged organization, consisting of
the following representatives. 
i Four seats representing the French Hill target area;
i Four seats representing the Tree Streets target
a r e a ;
i One seat representing the greater Nashua service
area (reserved for a beneficiary of programs prov i d-
ed by the new entity and living within the service
area but living outside of the French Hill and the
Tree Streets neighborhoods; 
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i One seat representing government (reserved for a
nonelected public official at the state or local level); 
i Three seats representing business (at least one of
these seats reserved for someone from a priva t e
financial institution and at least one reserved for an
a t t o r n ey); 
i Four seats for at-large representatives (may be
used, in part, to expand the new organization's fund-
raising capacity, to ensure representation by key con-
stituencies and to add geographic representation
from areas outside the city of Nashua, if the new
organization finds itself becoming actively engaged
in surrounding communities). 
The merger committee concluded its discussion of
board composition by recommending that the by -
l aws of the merged organization allow the flex i b i l i t y
to have a board somewhat smaller (or larger) than
17 members, as long as the ratios of representation
among the six categories remain similar to those
proposed. The committee also recommended reserv-
ing a nonvoting, ex-officio seat for a representative of
the Nashua Housing Authority (NHA).  Th ey suggest-
ed naming this ex officio NHA seat in the by l aws of
the merged organization.  The by l aws should also
a l l ow for the addition of “such other 'ex officio' non-
voting board members as the board may designate
from time to time.”  
M e m b e rs h i p
H aving decided how the board should be structured,
the merger committee looked next at the question of
h ow directors should be nominated and selected,
especially those residents representing each of the
t wo designated target areas.  This was a lengthy dis-
cussion, revolving around the question of whether
the new organization should have a voting member-
ship with the power to elect a portion of the board.  
The positions taken by the various participants in
this debate were unexpected.  Members of the com-
mittee from GNHDF, an organization with a self-per-
petuating board and no membership, were open to
the idea of building a membership base for the
merged organization and allowing that membership
to elect all of the resident representatives.  Members
of the committee from FHNHS, an organization that
had always had a voting membership, were opposed
to the idea and greeted any suggestion that a vo t i n g
membership might benefit the merged organization
with skepticism. 
Their skepticism was twofold: recent experience with
members who were sometimes complacent and
sometimes contentious and personal frustration at
the lack of invo l vement by board members other
than themselves in sustaining an organization with-
out a permanent director. When the GNHDF repre-
s e n t a t i ves heard the argument that members we r e
nothing but toil and trouble, they were easily per-
suaded not to “inflict” a voting membership on the
n ew organization. 
Davis and Hebert stepped momentarily out of their
assigned roles to urge the committee to look beyo n d
the parochial example of FHNHS and consider
whether a membership might someday have adva n-
tages for the merged organization, especially with
regard to community accountability, board recruit-
ment and fundraising. However, the committee could
not be budged from its conviction that members
would merely get in the way.
Th ey decided, therefore, that the new organization
should not have a voting membership — or, for that
matter, a membership of any kind — although the
door was left slightly ajar in recommending that the
by l aws should “a l l ow the board of directors to estab-
lish a membership at some future date.”  Without a
voting membership, the board of the merged organi-
zation would be self-perpetuating.  
Candidates for board seats would be identified by a
board-appointed nominating committee and ap-
p r oved by the board as a whole.  In considering the
nominating committee’s role, the merger committee
stated a clear preference for allowing the new orga-
n i z a t i o n ’s nominating process to determine the pre-
cise mix of interests, communities, skills and board
r e p r e s e n t a t i ves and to keep the by l aw language as
general and flexible as possible with regard to filling
particular seats. 
The merger committee expected the nominating
committee to consult with neighborhood associa-
tions, homeowner associations, tenant associations
and other organized interests within the target areas
and within the larger service area in nominating per-
sons to the board. However, it was the opinion of the
committee that “the value of diverse and comprehen-
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s i ve representation should be subordinated to the
importance of having capable and contributing board
members who are committed to the organization's
housing mission.”  
B o a rd Operations (Te rm of O ff i c e,
Q u o ru m , P roxy Vo t i n g )
Once the composition and selection of the board of
directors was out of the way, it was not difficult
reaching agreement on the term to be served and on
the requirement for a quorum on the new board.  Th e
merger committee’s recommendation was that direc-
tors should serve an initial term of three years with
the possibility of reappointment for a second three-
year term.  Th ey should be limited to two consecutive
terms (whether full or partial).  A director should
then be required to leave the board for a minimum of
one ye a r.  After a year off the board, he or she could
return for another two terms, if reappointed.  
A quorum, said the committee, should consist of a
simple majority of the board seats presently filled.
There should be no requirement for specific cate-
gories of representatives to be present for a quorum
to ex i s t .
Resolving the issue of whether to allow proxy vo t i n g
on the board of directors proved more difficult, prin-
cipally because the existing policies of the two organ-
izations were so different.  FHNHS did not allow
p r oxy or absentee voting. GNHDF made frequent use
of both.  Members of the committee eve n t u a l l y
agreed that, if proxies were allowed, there should be
a limit on the number of times a member could be
absent and the number of times a member could
exercise his/her proxy in any given ye a r.  The com-
mittee also agreed that any proxy voting should be
accompanied by strict requirements for notifying all
board members of issues to be discussed and votes to
be taken in upcoming meetings. 
S everal members of the committee, howeve r ,
remained adamantly opposed to allowing any prox i e s
w h a t s o eve r.  Ar r ayed on the other side were those
members who sided with GNHDF ’s ex e c u t i ve direc-
tor, who noted that speed and flexibility in a board’s
decision-making could sometimes make the difference
b e t ween a project going forward or a project getting
stalled (or killed).  After considering various alterna-
t i ves to proxy voting, including the delegation of deve l-
opment decision-making power to an ex e c u t i ve com-
mittee or limiting the use of absentee voting, the
merger committee finally decided that proxies wo u l d
not be allowed.  Th ey recommended, instead, allow i n g
absentee voting, under the following conditions.
“ When a rapid decision of the board is needed to
expedite housing development, but a quorum of the
board cannot be assembled, then board members
should be allowed to vote by signing and dating a
board resolution sent to them by fax or courier.
Once these signed resolutions are returned to the
merged organization, the board’s secretary should
tally the vote and document the result in corporate
minutes distributed to every member of the board.”  
This compromise protected the principle of one-
d i r e c t o r - o n e - vote, avoiding the delegation of power to
a small subset of the board and satisfying those
members of the merger committee who feared dilut-
ing the authority and independence of individual
directors.  At the same time, it satisfied the commit-
t e e ’s more production-minded members, and
GNHDF ’s ex e c u t i ve director, who wanted a way to
expedite decision-making when a project was at
stake.  Both sides went away happy.
Standing Committees
The committee recommended that the merged
organization should have half-a-dozen standing com-
mittees.  Considerable thought was given to what
each should do, resulting in the following proposal.
E xe c u t i ve Committee. This committee, made up
of the merged organization's officers, should have
general responsibility for overseeing all of the activi-
ties and operations.  It should serve as the ex e c u t i ve
director's principal support and sounding board.  It
should meet before every regularly scheduled meet-
ing of the full board to set the agenda and to narrow
the range of issues and options to be discussed. On a
c a s e - by-case basis, the full board might empower it
to take rapid action in approving key aspects of a
d evelopment project that is underway or about to get
u n d e r way.
Nominating Committee. In addition to nominat-
ing new members for the board of directors, this
com-mittee should also be responsible for board
training and board development.  
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R evolving Loan Committee. Required by
Neighborhood Reinvestment for all NeighborWo r k s®
affiliates, this standing committee should be respon-
sible for rev i ewing loan applications and underwrit-
ing loans from the merged organization's revo l v i n g
loan fund (RLF) (inherited from FHNHS).  
Finance Committee.  Responsibilities of this stand-
ing committee should include budget preparation,
budget oversight and oversight of all financial opera-
tions, including bookkeeping, audits, grantee com-
pliance, and contract management and reporting.  
Asset Development and Management
Committee.  This standing committee should ove r-
see property acquisitions, project construction and
rehabilitation, property management, and capital-
needs planning.  
R e s o u r c e - D evelopment Committee.  This stand-
ing committee should be responsible for fundraising,
public relations and marketing of both the organiza-
tion and its services.
S t a ffing Plan
After two months together, meeting five different
times, the merger committee had developed consid-
erable skill in deciding complicated structural and
operational issues. Just as importantly, they had de-
veloped considerable trust in one another.  Th ey we r e
as ready as they would ever be to tackle the most diffi-
cult issues: staffing, location and money.  
Discussion of the staffing plan for the merged organi-
zation occurred during the sixth and seventh meet-
ings, both of which where held in August.  Even in
N ew England, August can be hot and humid.  Th i s
was hardly an auspicious time for the cool and careful
consideration of how best to staff FHNHS and
GNHDF during the transition period between decid-
ing on the merger and completing the merger and
h ow best to staff the merged organization itself.  
The committee began cautiously, discussing what sort
of staff the organization might need to fulfill its mis-
sion and to administer its programs.  HOW these posi-
tions might be filled and WHO among the present staff
of FHNHS and GNHDF might be qualified to fill them
were questions that were left for later.  The committee
recommended six positions for the new organization:
ex e c u t i ve director, administrative assistant/bookkeep-
er, housing development specialist, housing rehab
specialist, loan officer/homebuyer counselor, and
neighborhood organizer.  Members of the committee
expressed a strong preference for filling this last posi-
tion with someone fluent in both English and Spanish.  
Th ey then turned their attention to the ticklish ques-
tion of how existing staff should be treated in filling
these positions.  No staff was present for this discus-
sion.  GNHDF ’s ex e c u t i ve director, who had partici-
pated in the committee’s previous discussions, wa s
asked not to attend the seventh meeting (held on
August 27).  The interim director for FHNHS, who
had attended the committee’s early meetings in June
and July, was gone by the middle of August, released
by the FHNHS board.  The merger committee wa s
free, therefore, to discuss candidly the strengths and
weaknesses of the existing staff.  Th ey were free to
consider objectively the best way to balance treating
old staff fairly while adding new staff who might be
more skilled than individuals presently employed by
either FHNHS or GNHDF.  
Organizational loyalties clouded this discussion from
the very beginning.  Representatives from FHNHS
b e l i eved in the competency of their own staff and
wanted to retain them.  Representatives from
GNHDF ’s board, knowing nothing about these indi-
viduals but wishing to be respectful of their FHNHS
counterparts on the committee, did not challenge the
assertion that the present staff of FHNHS were quali-
fied to assume similar positions in the merged organ-
ization.  Li k ewise, representatives from the FHNHS
board were loathe to challenge the belief of
GNHDF ’s representatives that their own staff (i.e.,
the individual who served as ex e c u t i ve director) wa s
the capable and reasonable choice to assume the
same position in the merged organization. 
No one was willing to argue that some staff should
s t ay and some should go without an external assess-
ment of organizational capacity and internal eva l u a-
tions of staff. This had not been done for many ye a r s
at FHNHS and had never been done at GNHDF. So,
the committee members merely followed the path of
least resistance in proposing the following plan for
staffing the merged organization.
“Existing GNHDF and FHNHS staff will be offered
their current positions within the post-merger organ-
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ization.  Th ey will also be given the first shot at any
n ew positions — i.e., if they express an interest in an
available position, their qualifications will be
r ev i ewed and a decision will be made whether to
offer them the job before such a position is adve r-
tised outside of the post-merger organization.  (On l y
if an existing staff person is not offered the job will a
n ew position be advertised ex t e r n a l l y.)  Staff carried
over into the post-merger organization will not have
a probationary period.  Their performance, howeve r ,
and the performance of the post-merger organization
itself will be evaluated at the new organization’s one-
year annive r s a r y.”
In light of this recommendation (modified slightly
during the implementation phase), the merger com-
mittee decided that it was unnecessary to establish a
transition plan for staffing the new organization.
Assuming that existing staff wanted to continue
doing the same jobs after the merger that they we r e
already doing in their separate organizations, the
committee concluded that no staffing changes (or ad-
ditions) would be needed during the implementation
phase of the merger process.  The committee did
note, however, that “staff from GNHDF and FHNHS
m ay begin holding joint staff meetings as early as
N ovember, prior to the actual incorporation/creation
of the post-merger organization.”  
No instructions were forthcoming from the commit-
tee, however, about telling staff from the two organi-
zations that joint meetings should happen, and
nobody stepped forward to ensure that they did hap-
pen.  Staff from the two organizations, as it turned
out, did not actually begin meeting together until
long after the merger was legally consummated on
July 1, 20 0 0 .
L o c at i o n
Where to locate the offices of the merged organiza-
tion was a decision that proved relatively easy, even
though everyone had been expecting the worst.  This
is why, in fact, it had been left until the end of the
planning process.  The committee avoided contro-
versy, however, by coming up with an expedient
compromise.  
Neither organization was asked to relinquish its
present location.  Instead, the committee declared
that a “continuing presence should be maintained in
both target neighborhoods.  Program staff should op-
erate out of both the present GNHDF office and the
present FHNHS office.  Both offices should be open
and staffed every we e k d ay.”  By reaffirming their
commitment to both of the target neighborhoods, the
committee decided quickly and easily where the cor-
porate headquarters should be, basing their decision
less on the political acceptability of a specific location
and more on the availability and suitability of specif-
ic space.  
FHNHS occupied newly constructed office space that
it owned. GNHDF occupied an old school building
that it leased from the city of Nashua at no charge
and shared with the police department.  It was an
easy choice to recommend making the present
FHNHS office as the administrative headquarters for
the postmerger organization. 
B u d ge t
Using approved fiscal year (FY) 2000 operating budg-
ets and updated information for GNHDF and
FHNHS, provided by staff from the two organiza-
tions, John Davis presented two scenarios for a com-
bined, postmerger operating budget. (See Ap p e n d i x
F: Annual Operating Budgets.)  Scenario #1 as-
sumed a staffing level of four.  Scenario #2 assumed
a staffing level of six (adding a rehab coordinator and
community organizer).  Both scenarios assumed that
FHNHS ’s employee-benefit package, which was far
more generous than the GNHDF ’s package, would be
applied to all of the staff positions in the postmerger
organization.  
The bad news in the combined budget was that
anticipated revenues would not be enough to cove r
the more ambitious staffing level the merger commit-
tee desired. The good news was that there was prob-
ably enough money comfortably on hand or in the
pipeline to consummate the merger and to operate
the merged organization _ as long as funders did not
impose what Davis described ironically as a “m e r g e r
p e n a l t y.”  
It was understood, however, that this combined
budget, as healthy and encouraging as it seemed,
was vulnerable on any number of fronts.  It might
also be substantially revised later on. In particular, it
was anticipated that the Neighborhood Reinve s t m e n t
r ev i ew team’s due-diligence look at both organiza-
2 0
tions in October might result in discoveries that
necessitated major changes in this combined budget.
Even so, the budget seemed to pose no significant
obstacle to merger.
L egal A dvice on Corp o rate Stru c t u re
The discussion of money and assets led to a discus-
sion of the kind of corporate structure best suited to
handle these and to effect the merger.  It was clear
that the time had come (or was, perhaps, long ove r -
due) to retain the services of an attorney who could
advise both boards on issues related to completing
the merger, transferring assets and establishing the
postmerger organization.  J.L. Swe e n ey, an attorney
serving on the merger committee who sat on the
boards of both FHNHS and GNHDF, was asked for
his opinion on the best corporate structure for the
merger that was being contemplated. Swe e n ey ’s ad-
vice was as follows .
1 . It is clear that the most ex p e n s i ve course of action
in terms of complexity, time and legal costs would be
to transfer the tax credit projects and other real-
estate assets owned by GNHDF to some other corpo-
rate entity.  It would be difficult, and costly, to trans-
fer these assets.
2 . It is equally clear that, except for the capital in its
RLF (the future disposition of which would be gov-
erned by a pre-existing capital grants agreement
b e t ween FHNHS and Neighborhood Reinve s t m e n t ) ,
FHNHS possesses very few real-estate assets. Two
buildings are the extent of its holdings.  Wh a t
FHNHS does own, moreover, is encumbered with
f ew of the financial, regulatory and legal strings that
entangle the assets owned by GNHDF.  It would be
easy, and inex p e n s i ve, to transfer these assets.
3 . Therefore, it would not be cost-effective to create a
n ew corporation to which the assets of both organi-
zations would be transferred. It would be more rea-
sonable to amend the articles and by l aws of GNHDF
(restructuring its mission, board and service area to
accommodate the committee’s many recommenda-
tions) and to transfer the assets of FHNHS to the cor-
porate shell of GNHDF.
The committee agreed that Sweeney’s proposal
would be presented to both boards as a tentative rec-
ommendation with the following understanding.
The proposed structure could be replaced or modi-
fied before the merger was consummated because of
the following reasons. 
i Findings emerged from the due-diligence review
of both organizations; 
i Requirements imposed by Neighborhood 
Reinvestment on the transfer of loan capital or the
transfer of FHNHS’s NeighborWorks® charter; or 
i Recommendations from another attorney.
The factors to be considered in determining which
mechanism to use in establishing a postmerger cor-
poration and in transferring assets would include
the following. 
i The comfort and acceptance of both organizations 
with the final proposal; 
i The desire of both organizations to minimize the 
time and cost of transferring assets (particularly 
GNHDF’s tax credit projects); and 
i The legal requirements (including those of 
Neighborhood Reinvestment) for accomplishing 
any such transfer.
In the meantime, Swe e n ey agreed to consult with a
legal colleague who was said to be know l e d g e a b l e
about corporate mergers and to ask for a legal read
of the proposal that he had put on the table.
Regardless of any free advice provided by Swe e n ey ’s
colleague, however, it was understood that there
would be legal costs associated with the merger.
Eventually, the two organizations were going to need
to hire an attorney to structure the new corporation
and to prepare documents for the transfer of assets.
Since Neighborhood Reinve s t m e n t ’s policy was nei-
ther to provide such legal assistance nor to pay for it,
GNHDF and FHNHS should expect to cover this
merger cost.  
Naming the Po s t m e rger Orga n i z at i on
The merger committee decided not to tackle this
question, preferring to allow and to encourage wider
participation from board members and neighbor-
hood residents in choosing a name and logo for the
postmerger organization. Committee members did
declare, however, that the process to be used in mak-
ing this decision should be as inclusive, participatory
and celebratory as possible.
Tasks and Timeline for Completing the Merge r
At the committee’s final meeting, on September 10,
John Davis handed out a draft timeline entitled
“GNHDF/FHNHS Merger: What’s Next?” (See
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Appendix G.) After reviewing this document, the
committee recommended accelerating the timeline
proposed.  They agreed with Davis’ assessment that
the legal consolidation of assets, organizations and
staffs would take time and would likely not be com-
pleted until later in the coming year.  But they want-
ed the two staffs to begin meeting and the two
organizations to begin functioning in a consolidated
fashion much sooner, preferably by November.
It was agreed that both boards would be asked to
approve (or revise) the committee’s recommenda-
tions at their October meetings, as well as to appoint
representatives to a "merger steering committee"
that would be empowered to “take all actions neces-
sary” to complete the merger.  Davis was asked to
draft such a resolution, in consultation with
Sweeney.
The committee then discussed what sort of consult-
ant services might be needed during the upcoming
transition period, expected to extend from October
1999 through January 2000.  FHNHS offered the
services of a local organizational development spe-
cialist, Carolyn Benthien, who might work with the
steering committee and the staffs of both organiza-
tions in finalizing the details of the postmerger orga-
nization.  FHNHS had been planning to hire
Benthien (with Neighborhood Reinvestment fund-
ing) before the start of merger talks with GNHDF.
Once those talks began, a decision was made to wait
until later, anticipating that she might be needed to
help implement the merger plan. 
The committee agreed that the time had now arrived
to employ her services.  Neighborhood Reinvest-
ment was still willing to pay for her time, and Davis
concurred that a close-by consultant would be
preferable during the next phase of the merger.  Her
credibility and contacts among local funders, more-
over, led the committee to hope that she might assist
the new organization in crafting a plan for inform-
ing public officials, private donors and the public of
the planned merger and for soliciting financial sup-
port from them.  The committee easily decided to
recommend that Benthien be hired to assist with
implementation, assuming that both boards agreed
in October to proceed with the merger.  Davis would
still be available, courtesy of Neighborhood
Reinvestment, to draft merger documents and to
provide support for the merger, if needed, but he
would relinquish the facilitator’s role to Benthien.  
Finally, because it was now apparent to all that the
merger was likely to proceed, the committee be-
l i eved that the time had come for a due-diligence
r ev i ew of the participating organizations.  La R ay n e
Hebert was asked whether Neighborhood
R e i nve s t m e n t ’s program-rev i ew team might be
available to scrutinize the operations of both
FHNHS and GNHDF, even though the latter wa s
not a network affiliate.  Hearing from her that the
Corporation had always expected that a rev i ew of
both organizations would be necessary and that its
team of experts was standing by, the committee
g ave Hebert the go-ahead to bring them in.  Th i s
was the merger committee’s final decision.  Its
work was done. i
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I m p l e m e n t at i o n
WHEREAS the boards of French Hill Neighborhood
Housing Services (FHNHS) and the Greater Nashua
Housing and Development Foundation (GNHDF)
separately decided in May 1999 to establish a
"Merger Committee" and assigned staff members and
board members from their respective organizations to
serve on this committee; and 
WHEREAS the Merger Committee was authorized by
the boards of FHNHS and GNHDF to engage in a
“systematic exploration” of a possible merger of
FHNHS and GNHDF and to make recommendations
to both boards as to how such a merger might be
structured and completed; and 
WHEREAS the Merger Committee convened on eight
occasions between May 28 and September 10 and sys-
tematically explored the options and opportunities
for merging FHNHS and GNHDF; and 
WHEREAS the Merger Committee reached consensus
on recommendations regarding the purpose and pro-
grams, organizational structures, and operations of a
corporate merger of FHNHS and GNHDF; and
WHEREAS the Merger Committee has completed its
work and conveyed its recommendations to the
boards of FHNHS and GNHDF; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the
FHNHS Board of Directors, having reviewed the rec-
ommendations of the Merger Committee, does hereby
endorse the proposed merger of FHNHS and GNHDF
in accordance with the Merger Committee’s recom-
mendations.  Notwithstanding this endorsement, it is
understood that some of these recommendations may
be modified during the months ahead as a result of
rulings or recommendations from the Neighborhood
Reinvestment Corporation, the Merger Steering
Committee, or attorneys and consultants hired to
expedite the merger.  It is also understood that the
final terms of conditions of the proposed merger of
FHNHS and GNHDF will be reviewed and approved
by the FHNHS board and the GNHDF board before
assets from either corporation are transferred to
another corporate entity.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that J.L. Sweeney,
who presently serves on the boards of both FHNHS
and GNHDF, shall be appointed to serve on a newly
constituted “Merger Steering Committee,” along with
the following five persons who shall represent the
interests of FHNHS on this committee:
Debra B. Miller/ Robert Keating/ Pauline Francey 
David Darling/ Pauline Ikawa
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Merger
Steering Committee is hereby granted the authority to
take all actions necessary to prepare for the merger of
FHNHS and GNHDF and to manage the affairs of
both organizations during the period prior to the
merger of FHNHS and GNHDF, including but not
limited to: 
i the hiring of an attorney and other consultants to
expedite the merger of FHNHS and GNHDF;
i negotiation of the final terms and conditions for a
merger of FHNHS and GNHDF;
i review and approval of bylaws for a new nonprofit
corporation or review and approval of bylaw amend-
ments for an existing nonprofit corporation, which
corporation shall eventually inherit the programs
and assets of both FHNHS and GNHDF; and
i support and supervision of the FHNHS staff and
the GNHDF staff until such time as new (or amend-
ed) bylaws have been recorded with the State of New
Hampshire and a board of directors for this new (or
restructured) corporation has been seated.  
T
wo weeks after the merger committee’s final meeting, John Davis prepared and distributed
to both boards a packet containing a detailed summary of the committee’s recommendations
(Appendix H), a revised timeline for completing the merger (Appendix I) and a postmerger
annual operating budget (Appendix F).  Davis and J.L Sweeney also drafted a resolution for
the boards to consider at their upcoming meetings.  The FHNHS version of this resolution
read as follows.
Completing the
Merger
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The FHNHS board approved this resolution on
September 23, 1999.  The GNHDF board soon fol-
l owed suit, approving a resolution identical in form to
the one above on October 5, naming the follow i n g
persons as their representatives to the merger steer-
ing committee: Beth Raymond, Roger Du h a m e l ,
Angie Kopka, Michael Fox and Bertha Perkins.  In the
case of GNHDF, this was the final approval that
would be needed to proceed with the merger.  Th e
b o a r d ’s decision would not have to be ratified by a
membership, since GNHDF did not have one.  An d
no conveyance of GNHDF property or other assets
was contemplated.  From GNHDF ’s side, the way wa s
n ow completely clear to merge with FHNHS.
FHNHS still had a couple of hurdles to cross.
FHNHS was a membership organization.  Its mem-
bers would have to approve any plan to merge with
GNHDF.  On October 28, FHNHS held its annual
membership meeting, where the plan to merge with
GNHDF was presented.  After considerable discus-
sion, the members approved a resolution similar to
the one that had been approved by the FHNHS board
of directors a month earlier.  This resolution endorsed
the proposed merger of FHNHS and GNHDF, in
accordance with the merger committee’s recommen-
dations.  It also endorsed “the decisions of the
FHNHS board, made on September 23, 1999, includ-
ing: 
i establishing the Merger Steering Co m m i t t e e ;
i appointing Debra B. Miller, Robert Keating, Pa u l i n e
Fr a n c ey, David Darling, and Pauline Ikawa to that
committee, joining J.L. Swe e n ey and five representa-
t i ves from GNHDF; and 
i granting that committee the authority to prepare for
the merger of FHNHS and GNHDF and to manage
the affairs of both organizations during the period
prior to the merger of FHNHS and GNHDF.”
A more significant hurdle for FHNHS was the trans-
fer of assets. Under the plan proposed by the merger
committee, any assets owned by FHNHS would be
c o nveyed to GNHDF, restructured and renamed
according to the committee’s recommendations.  Th e
most valuable of these assets was a revolving loan
fund (RLF) that had been capitalized in full by the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation.  The con-
tents of this RLF could not be conveyed without
Neighborhood Reinve s t m e n t ’s approval.  Th e
Co r p o r a t i o n ’s approval would be needed for another
c o nveyance, as well.  
One of the prizes of a FHNHS and GNHDF merger,
coveted by all who had participated in the protracted
process of exploring and negotiating the consolida-
tion, was the chance to win a NeighborWorks® char-
ter for the blended organization. By the end of phase
two, it was still an open question whether
Neighborhood Reinvestment would be willing to
convey FHNHS’s existing membership in the
NeighborWorks® network to the postmerger organi-
zation, which would inherit FHNHS’s other assets,
or whether a whole new review and chartering
process would be required.  
More fundamentally, there were a number of ques-
tions about the soundness of the organizational in-
heritance that the new organization was slated to
receive from both FHNHS and GNHDF.  Were there
problems lurking in the property portfolio of
GNHDF or the loan portfolio of FHNHS?  Were the
financial, reporting and management systems of the
organizations equal to the standards required by
Neighborhood Reinvestment for NeighborWorks®
affiliation?  Were the personnel inherited from
FHNHS and GNHDF capable of achieving the high-
er levels of productivity, efficiency and sustainability
that the merger’s leaders and funders hoped would
result from this merger?  
Finding answers to these questions was going to be
the responsibility of the steering committee that had
been appointed to implement the merger and of the
Neighborhood Reinvestment program review team
that was headed to Nashua to examine the opera-
tions of both organizations.  This two-person team
visited FHNHS and GNHDF during the middle of
October, after both boards had voted to proceed with
the merger.  Their report would not be finished and
widely distributed, however, for a couple of months. 
Not wishing to delay the merger’s implementation,
which both organizations were now eager to com-
plete, the leaders of the newly established steering
committee decided not to wait for this report before
beginning their own work.  They met for the first
time on November 2, 1999.  
Nine of the eleven representatives appointed by the
two boards to the steering committee were present.
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Eight of them had served on the merger committee.
There was one new member present, representing
FHNHS.  (GNHDF had appointed two new members
to its team, but they were absent from this first
meeting and never appeared at any that followed.) At
the head of the table was the new facilitator, Carolyn
Benthien, who was hired with funds provided by
Neighborhood Reinvestment to FHNHS to help
implement the plan that had come out of phase two
of the merger process. The Corporation’s representa-
tive, LaRayne Hebert, who had participated in the
previous phases of the merger process, was also
present and would attend all of the steering commit-
tee’s meetings.  Davis, whose work was now done,
except for drafting amendments to the GNHDF
bylaws, was not in attendance, nor was Mike
LaFontaine.  
For the first time, no staff members were present to
participate in the committee’s deliberations.  It had
been decided that the steering committee should be
given the authority to monitor and to supervise the
operations of both organizations during the transi-
tion period.  This committee should function like the
board of directors of a consolidated organization,
even though the merger had not yet been completed.
It was more appropriate, therefore, for the steering
committee to convene without staff in attendance,
especially since personnel issues were likely to be a
high priority on the agenda.  
The implementation phase of the Nashua merger
began the same way as the negotiation phase had
begun. Benthien handed out a task and timeline
matrix, sequencing the work that needed to be done
to complete the merger (Appendix I).  Right away,
she ran into resistance from a couple of committee
members who had already braved (and barely toler-
ated) months of meetings and negotiations.  It was
their opinion 90 percent of the issues that separated
the two organizations had been settled in phase two;
consequently, they wondered why Benthien wanted
to belabor questions they believed had already been
answered.  From their perspectives, the deal was
done; everybody had voted to merge, “so let’s
merge.”  The staff could work out any personnel
issues or financial issues that remained.  More “pro-
cessing” of the terms and conditions of the merger
was simply a waste of time.  
These dissenting voices, as it turned out, did not rep-
resent the opinion of the majority. Other members of
the committee accepted the facilitator’s argument,
which the Neighborhood Reinvestment representa-
tive supported, that it was the steering committee’s
responsibility to make detailed decisions about per-
sonnel policies, job descriptions, and roles and
responsibilities of the new board during the pre-
merger period.  Resolving these issues, along with
naming the new organization and deciding whether
a simple transfer of assets from FHNHS to GNHDF
was legally the best way to complete the merger,
were adopted as the committee’s priorities.  Still, it
took another meeting or two before the dissenters
were fully convinced that more process was actually
needed before the merger could happen.  
It was anticipated, at this first meeting in November,
that the steering committee’s work would take 60 to
90 days. The committee’s expectation was that assets
would be transferred, a new board would be seated,
and the staffs of FHNHS and GNHDF would be
combined by the end of February 2000, the one-year
anniversary of the first exploratory meeting dis-
cussing a possible merger. This expectation was
consistent with the timeline distributed by Benthien
and the timeline that the merger committee had
adopted during phase two. 
It turned out to take much longer.  The merger was
not legally consummated until July 1, 2001.  The
separate staffs of the two organizations did not phys-
ically relocate and begin fully to function as a single,
unified staff until November.
Why the delay?  By the spring of 2000, the committee
dissenters were not the only people raising this vex-
ing question; so too were a number of interested
observers outside of the two organizations.  Three
obstacles appeared during the implementation
phase to slow things down.  
First of all, a definitive legal decision on the best way
to merge the two organizations was put off again
and again.  Not until January was an attorney
retained.  Not until April did the steering committee
receive an attorney’s opinion about, at long last, the
tentative decision made back in September by the
merger committee not to create a new corporation.
Instead, they had decided that the preferred way to
go, legally and financially, was to revise GNHDF’s
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bylaws and transfer FHNHS’s assets to GNHDF.
Another obstacle to quick implementation was the
c o m m i t t e e ’s discovery that job descriptions, person-
nel policies and performance evaluations we r e
woefully inadequate in both organizations.
Although the initial reaction of some committee
members was, once again, that it was unnecessary
to delve into these matters at this particular time,
the majority believed these organizational flaws
had to be addressed before the merger’s comple-
tion.  The existing employees of FHNHS weighed in
on this issue as well, insisting that they wanted to
be evaluated, with a written report placed in their
personnel files, before the staffs of the two organi-
zations were merged.  
Another delay in completing the merger resulted
from the compromise that was struck during phase
two regarding the location of the new organization’s
offices.  The merger committee had recommended,
and the boards of the two organizations had agreed,
that the offices owned and occupied by FHNHS
would become the corporate headquarters of the
merged organization, and a satellite office would be
retained at the former site of GNHDF’s office.  
The merger committee had also suggested that the
staffs of the two organizations should begin meeting
and working together during the implementation
phase, long before the merger was actually complet-
ed.  Indeed, in the “what’s next” timeline for the
merger, the committee had hoped that the two staffs
might begin functioning as one in November.  This
did not occur for another year.
The executive director for GNHDF, backed by mem-
bers of the organization’s board, refused to relocate
to the French Hill neighborhood or even to consoli-
date staffing functions until someone could be hired
to staff the satellite office.  This was, for her and for
her board, a matter of keeping faith with GNHDF’s
original constituents in the Tree Streets neighbor-
hood.  Holding out for additional help was prompt-
ed, as well, by the fact that GNHDF had live projects
in the development pipeline, which a one-person
staff was trying to move forward amidst the clutter,
confusion and uncertainty of a merger.
Faced with these realities, the steering committee
was forced to divert attention away from other merg-
er matters and to concentrate immediately on draft-
ing a job description for a community organizer and
overseeing the process of hiring this new employe e ,
who would work out of GNHDF ’s former offices.
This slowed the pace of the merger’s implementation.
Despite these unforeseen delays, the steering com-
mittee continued to meet, acting as the de facto
board for both organizations, while gamely chipping
away at a mountain of merger minutiae.  By the start
of the new year, job descriptions had been reviewed
and revised for the executive director, the asset
manager and the rehab specialist.  Revised job
descriptions were in the process of being drafted for
the loan officer and administrative assistant.  A job
description detailing the roles and responsibilities of
board members had been developed.  A first draft of
revised personnel policies had been distributed for
the committee’s review.  And, after much discussion,
a name had been selected for the new organization: 
Neighborhood Housing Services of
G re ater Nashua (NHSGN).
The merger committee also had in hand, for consid-
eration at its meeting on January 6, 2000, the written
report from Neighborhood Reinvestment’s program
review team, which had examined the finances, sys-
tems, and policies and procedures of both FHNHS
and GNHDF.  This report revealed several areas of
concern. 
i Weaknesses in financial management and report-
ing for both organizations; 
i Incompatibilities between FHNHS’s accrual-based
system and GNHDF’s cash-based system; 
i The need for a detailed understanding of all con-
tractual agreements and obligations for both organi-
zations; and 
i The need for improved personnel policies (a defi-
ciency which the steering committee did not begin
tackling until after the program review team had
come and gone).  
Although members of the steering committee had
previously been reluctant to divide themselves into
separate committees, the sheer magnitude and com-
plexity of the merger tasks that remained, given new
clarity and urgency by the report of Neighborhood
Reinvestment’s program review team, prompted
them to create five different work groups.  One
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group would focus on issues of financial consolida-
tion, fiscal policy congruence and management
alignment.  LaRayne Hebert offered the services of a
Neighborhood Reinvestment financial consultant to
assist this group.  This consultant, Jim Word, visited
Nashua on January 12 and later provided specific
recommendations for improving and integrating the
financial management systems and the computer
systems of the two organizations.  
The second work group focused on preparing a
summary of contracts and commitments that were
outstanding for each organization.  The remaining
three groups focused, respectively, on personnel
policies and job descriptions, governance of the new
organization, and the legal documents that would be
needed to effect the transfer of assets once the ques-
tion of corporate structure was settled.  
The steering committee met one more time in
January to review final drafts of the job descriptions
and personnel policies and to approve salary ranges
for each position.  The personnel committee was
given the authority to present these job descriptions
and salary ranges to the existing staff of FHNHS and
GNHDF and to ask who might be interested in stay-
ing with Neighborhood Housing Services of Greater
Nashua, once the merger was completed.  
The committee then adjourned, agreeing that the
separate work groups would continue to labor away
on their respective assignments. The whole commit-
tee would not meet again until there was a legal
opinion on the question of the best way to structure
the postmerger corporation and to arrange for the
transfer of assets.  Two months passed before that
opinion arrived.  
The steering committee reconvened on April 3.  At
long last, an attorney’s opinion letter was in hand,
accompanied by the documents needed to complete
the merger.  The work group assigned to deal with
legal issues reported that the structure recommend-
ed long ago by the merger committee was not only
acceptable but preferable.  The changes in GNHDF’s
bylaws that Davis had drafted at the conclusion of
phase two, incorporating the merger committee’s
recommendations for the postmerger organization,
could be dusted off, given a quick review by the
committee’s attorney and adopted by GNHDF’s
existing board of directors.  FHNHS’s assets and
obligations could then be transferred to GNHDF,
restructured and renamed Neighborhood Housing
Services of Greater Nashua.  
The other work groups had not been idle since the
steering committee’s last meeting.  Members of the
personnel work group had met individually with
existing staff at F HNHS, completed performance
evaluations for each person and determined that all
staff members wished to retain their former posi-
tions in the postmerger organization.  This included
GNHDF’s executive director who, after considering
whether to narrow her role in the new organization
to that of housing developer, decided that she would
prefer being the executive director.
The only sticking point was that FHNHS’s staff
members were worried about losing the sick leave
and vacation time they had accrued under a policy
that was more generous than the personnel policies
that the postmerger organization would allow.  The
steering committee removed this problem by adopt-
ing a motion protecting the accrued leave and vaca-
tion time of existing employees.  The committee
affirmed that all existing employees of FHNHS and
GNHDF would be employed in a similar capacity
after the merger.
The financial-consolidation work group shared with
the other steering committee members the recom-
mendations from the Neighborhood Reinvestment
consultant for merging the financial management
systems of the two organizations.  It was agreed that
staff should develop a plan for addressing these rec-
ommendations and should arrange for a premerger
audit of both organizations.  The financial consolida-
tion work group also presented an annual operating
budget for the new organization (Appendix F),
which was reviewed and approved by the entire
committee.  
The only task that remained for the steering com-
mittee was to decide who should serve on the new
board, filling the categories agreed upon during
phase two.  The governance work group reported
that all members currently serving on the boards of
FHNHS and GNHDF would be willing to serve on
the board of the new organization.  Since there had
been attrition on both boards during the long period
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of negotiating and implementing the merger, every
director that remained could be invited to serve on
the new board.  It was agreed that such an invitation
should be extended and that all tasks assigned to the
work groups should be completed by the end of
April.  The hope was that the first official meeting of
the new board could be held in May.
This time, the committee’s deadline was met.  On
May 30, 2000, individuals who were to serve as the
board of directors of N HSGN convened for the first
time.  Four of the thirteen directors for this new
board had previously served on the board of
GNHDF.  Five had previously served on the board of
FHNHS.  One had previously served on the boards
of both organizations.  Three had served on neither
board.  For the first time since the merger’s imple-
mentation phase had begun, a member of the staff
was also present: Bridgett Beldon Jette, GNHDF’s
executive director, who had agreed to become exec-
utive director of the postmerger organization.  
More significantly, for the first time since the merger
process had begun in February 1999, there were no
outsiders in attendance: no private consultants, no
one from the New Hampshire Affordable Housing
Network, no one from the New Hampshire
Charitable Foundation, and no one from the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation.  Alone at
last, the board and staff of NHSGN were ready to
run the organization that had emerged out of an
arduous process of merging two nonprofit housing
development organizations.  
The first order of business was the board’s own
organization.  Debbie Miller was named the first
president of NHSGN. She had served as president of
FHNHS and was its de facto executive director
amidst the turbulent comings and goings of a found-
ing executive director and an interim director, and
she had set the merger process in motion more than
a year before. Roger Duhamel, who had served as
GNHDF’s president, was named vice president of
the newly merged organization.  
Members of the board then reviewed the boundaries
and bylaws for NHSGN.  They agreed that both
should take essentially the same form that had been
previously recommended by the merger committee,
although the boundaries of both target neighbor-
hoods (French Hill and the Tree Streets) should be
slightly expanded.  Final ratification of the new
organization’s boundaries and bylaws was sched-
uled for the board’s next meeting.  This was to be an
all-day retreat, combining strategic planning with
adoption of the bylaws and of a conflict-of-interest
policy.  The board decided that Carolyn Benthien
should be invited to facilitate this planning session
and that all members of the board and the staff for
the new organization should be included.  The date
set for this retreat was June 24.  
The retreat was the final chapter in the process of
merging French Hill Neighborhood Housing Services
and the Greater Nashua Housing and Deve l o p m e n t
Foundation.  Appropriately, it was also the first chap-
ter in the process of launching Neighborhood Housing
Services of Greater Nashua.  By l aws were formally
adopted.  New directors were formally seated.  New
officers, named in the previous meeting, were formal-
ly elected.  And a strategic plan for the new organiza-
tion (Appendix J) was carefully outlined. 
Another outcome was just as important in laying a
foundation for the future.  As the day progressed, there
was a subtle but dramatic shift in the language and
perceptions of the meeting’s participants.  Boundaries
that had distinguished and divided FHNHS and
GNHDF began to blur.  For the first time, staff and
board began using “we,” taking possession of the
organization for which they now had joint responsibil-
i t y.  By the day ’s end, the merger of FHNHS and
GNHDF was finally, officially complete. i
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Re fl e c t i o n
A
suggestion was made in the opening pages
of this narrative that nonprofit mergers like
the one completed in Nashua may be too
recent and too few to say for certain what
the ingredients may be for their success.  A wa r n i n g
was also sounded about leaping too quickly to apply
the lessons from one collaboration to another, uncriti-
cally assuming that what worked especially well in
one situation will work equally well somewhere else.
Both cautions are worth repeating.  It is always risky
to suggest that a single edifice, no matter how careful-
ly constructed, should serve as a blueprint for similar
projects on similar sites.  
While no such claim is made for the Nashua merger,
a number of things that were tried in the process of
combining FHNHS and G NHDF had pretty good
results.  It may be too soon to proclaim any of them
a "best" practice for crafting collaborations or for
consummating mergers, but many seem solid
enough to warrant a closer look.  Nashua’s problem,
after all, is not unusual, nor is the way it was solved.
Collaboration is being proposed with increasing fre-
quency by funders, policymakers and practitioners
across the country as a preferred strategy for
addressing weaknesses arising within the nonprofit
housing sector, especially when multiple nonprofits
share the same locale.  Merger — the most extreme
form collaboration can take is becoming a common
occurrence.  Before moving too far and too quickly
down this unfamiliar path, however, it makes sense
to reflect on where we’ve been, report on what we’ve
seen and share what was learned along the way.
What lessons can be gleaned from the Nashua merg-
er?  What worked well in that particular New
England city that might work well in ex p l o r i n g ,
negotiating and implementing similar collaborations
in other communities? 
First of all, it should be acknowledged that some of
the things that helped Nashua’s process to succeed
were purely serendipitous.  Th ey were not planned
or programmed.  Th ey were simply there, a constel-
lation of golden opportunity and simple good luck
that made it more likely that any intervention nudging
the two organizations closer together was going to
work.  To admit this is to take nothing away from
those who designed and facilitated this lengthy
process, nor from those who participated so willingly
in it.  Th ey did a fine job.  There is much to be learned
from their conversations and deeds.  
Their performances took place, however, on a stage
set by circumstances beyond their personal control,
f avoring precisely those outcomes these practitioners
and participants were most intent on achieving.  Any
list of fortuitous circumstances in the Nashua case
would have to include the follow i n g :
i Two organizations with complementary programs
and complementary strengths;
i Two organizations with weaknesses of a size and
s everity not likely to jeopardize the survival of the
postmerger organization; 
i Two housing portfolios containing neither serious
bleeders nor ticking bombs;
i The departure, at a timely moment, of the ex e c u t i ve
director of FHNHS;
i Core competency among the staff that remained;
i  Leadership on the FHNHS side of the table by a
capable president who — after helping to remove an
ex e c u t i ve director, hire an interim director and fire
that interim director, and after playing a hands-on role
in helping to manage FHNHS for nearly a year — had
the confidence and determination not only to initiate
the merger process but to see it through to the end; 
i Leadership on the GNHDF side of the table by a
board member who, after participating in a merger
the year before involving the social service agency of
which she was the director, had the knowledge and
credibility to help steer GNHDF through a merger of
its own; 
i Participation on the exploratory committee, the
merger committee and the steering committee by indi-
viduals who managed, nearly all of the time, to check
their organizational loyalties at the door, bringing to
the conversation a spirit of civility, cooperation and
compromise; and  
i Hands-off support from institutional funders who
had the patience to wait for the right moment to inter-
vene and, once the merger process began, the wisdom
to resist the temptation to pick the participants, pres-
sure the process or second-guess the products that
s l owly emerged during a year-and-a-half of meetings.  
Without these serendipitous ingredients, the process of
Learning from 
the Merger Pr o c e s s
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merging FHNHS and GNHDF would have gone far
less smoothly and taken far more time. Yet it is also
true that these favorable circumstances would neve r
h ave been sufficient, entirely by themselves, to engen-
der a merger.  Someone had to make it happen, guid-
ing the prospective partners through a process that
was carefully planned and artfully executed.  Lu c k
p l ayed a part, but design won the day.  In the end, the
most important lessons to be learned from the Nashua
merger are to be found among those pieces of the
process under the conscious control of one (or more)
of the practitioners who made that merger a reality.  
Dividing the Process into Manageable Phases 
What worked especially well in Nashua was the divi-
sion of a lengthy and complex process into three dis-
tinct and manageable phases: exploration, negotia-
tion and implementation.  From first mention of the
possibility of combining FHNHS and GNHDF until
the final transfer of assets from one corporation to
another, the process took nearly a year and a half.
Only by breaking this merger marathon into shorter
i n t e r vals could the interest, energy and commitment
of the participants be sustained: a three-month gallop
for phase one, a five-month canter for phase two and
a nine-month saunter for phase three.  
For each phase, there was a clear beginning and a
clear end.  There were different goals; there were dif-
ferent tasks; and, as it happened, there were different
facilitators.  Each phase began by mapping the road
the committee would follow.  Each phase ended by
documenting the ground the committee had cove r e d ,
while pointing out where eve r yone should go nex t .
Each phase provided, in short, a sense of progress, a
sense of closure and a clear view of the road ahead.  
Making Use of Outside Facilitators
H aving a neutral party on hand to convene, to guide
and, on occasion, to referee the meetings being held
to discuss a possible merger was essential.  No mat-
ter how favorably disposed toward one another the
participants in these discussions undoubtedly we r e ,
no matter how ready to pursue a merger, there
were plenty of times when different interests, ex p e-
riences or organizational histories resulted in a dis-
agreement over what the merged organization
should be or do. 
At those moments, having a disinterested person at
the head of the table, imposing order and pointing in
a single direction was essential to finding common
ground.  Even when agreement seemed easy, the
sheer complexity and length of the merger process
made it necessary for one person to act as “clerk of
the works” for the process as a whole. Someone who
kept in mind the overall plan for the job, ensuring
that every piece eventually got done and that eve r y
m oving part actually fit together was needed.  
There was a special advantage, in the Nashua case,
to having three different facilitators, one for each
phase of the merger process.  This was probably a
luxury more than a necessity, since any one of the
three facilitators used in the Nashua merger could
h ave overseen the entire process.  Changing facili-
tators, on the other hand, helped to demarcate each
phase: bringing each to a clear conclusion; starting
each with a new agenda and a fresh face.  The differ-
ent backgrounds and styles of the three facilitators,
m o r e over, seemed especially well-suited to the dis-
t i n c t i ve tasks of the particular phase that each wa s
asked to oversee.  
Because of his previous history and personal credi-
bility with all parties, Mike La Fontaine was able to
win quick consensus on points of commonality and
to secure a ready commitment to a process aimed at
merging the two organizations.  Because of his pre-
vious experience designing and facilitating similar
nonprofit mergers, John Davis was adept at negoti-
ating agreement on points of divergence, resolving
k ey issues of program and governance.  Because of
her expertise in board development, staff deve l o p-
ment and strategic planning, Carolyn Benthien wa s
the perfect choice to force attention to issues of per-
sonnel and performance that had long been ove r-
looked by both organizations — issues that could no
longer be ignored if the postmerger organization
was to succeed.
It should be noted, as well, that while La R ay n e
Hebert did not serve as a facilitator per se, she wa s
often able to move a discussion along when it got
stuck on questions of what Neighborhood Reinve s t -
ment Corporation might do or might accept.
Because winning a place in the NeighborWo r k s®
n e t work was so important a prize of Nashua’s merg-
er process, finding answers to such questions could
easily have diverted and delayed the committees’
3 0
deliberations.  This never happened, because some-
one with technical knowledge of Neighborhood
R e i nve s t m e n t ’s requirements was always in the
room, helping the committee to navigate around any
shoals that might have interrupted the flow of their
c o nversation.  
The only drawback to using sequential facilitators
was the discontinuity that occurred between phases
t wo and three.  Two months went by between the last
meeting of the merger committee on September 8
and the first meeting of the steering committee on
N ovember 2.  More disruptive than the passage of
time, however, was the lack of overlap between the
second facilitator and the third.  Unlike the transi-
tion from phase one to phase two, where La Fo n t a i n e
had stepped down as the facilitator but continued to
participate in the deliberations facilitated by Dav i s ,
neither La Fontaine nor Davis participated in the
meetings of phase three.  Benthien went it alone.
Furthermore, unlike the ex t e n s i ve discussions that
occurred between La Fontaine and Davis prior to
Dav i s ’s assumption of responsibility for facilitating
the merger committee, Benthien and Davis did not
h ave a single conversation until after her first couple
of meetings with the steering committee.  In retro-
spect this hand-off of responsibility between Dav i s
and Benthien could have been handled more
s m o o t h l y.  
Not only should they have met prior to the first meet-
ing of the steering committee, Davis should probably
h ave attended the first meeting of that committee. It
would have made Benthien’s job easier if he had
been there to remind eve r yone of tasks undone in
phase two that had been intentionally deferred to
phase three.  He could have shared the burden of
persuading disgruntled members of the committee
that much remained to be done before FHNHS and
GNHDF could merge. 
Compiling a Written Re c o rd
One of the key services performed by all three facili-
tators was ensuring the preparation and distribution
of a written record of issues confronted, decisions
deferred and decisions made.  This allowed each
committee to keep track of its progress, enabling one
decision to build on another.  It kept decisions from
getting revisited or lost.  At the end of each phase,
this written record became the basis for comprehen-
s i ve reports to the respective boards.  After the merg-
er, this historical record helped new members (and
old members) of the consolidated organization’s
board to recall the choices confronted and compro-
mises reached by their predecessors in putting the
merger together.  
Board Domination of the Bargaining Committee 
The committees charged with overseeing each phase
of the merger process were composed almost entirely
of individuals drawn from the FHNHS and GNHDF
boards.  The only staff members invo l ved in these
discussions were the ex e c u t i ve director from one
organization and the interim director from the other,
and they were invo l ved only during phases one and
t wo.  No staff members were invo l ved in the deliber-
ations of the steering committee.  Even when mem-
bers of the staff were present, representatives from
the two boards outnumbered them five-to-one. Th i s
was a conscious decision.  
From day one, the merger was designed to be a
b o a r d - d r i ven process.  Board members were consid-
ered (correctly) to be less protective than the two
staffs of organizational turf, less entrenched in old
ways of doing business and more receptive to blend-
ing the operations of the two organizations.  Th ey
had less baggage to shed from previous conflicts
i nvolving FHNHS and GNHDF.  Th ey had less to
lose if a merger went forward, including their jobs.
Th ey also had more leverage with their peers, which
would be essential in convincing their fellow board
members to support whatever merger plan emerged
from the committees’ deliberations.  
B eyond these pragmatic considerations, board mem-
bers were tapped to take the lead in exploring, ne-
gotiating and implementing the merger of FHNHS
and GNHDF simply because it was their legal, fi-
duciary and moral responsibility to do so.  Merging
t wo nonprofit organizations, accompanied by the
probable dissolution of one (or both), is board busi-
ness.  It should not be assigned to someone else, eve n
to capable and trusted staff.
A Clear Delegation of Authority
Members of the merger committee and, later, the
steering committee, were given clear grants of
authority to pursue the merger of FHNHS and
GNHDF.  As each phase concluded and before anoth-
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er began, both boards were required to adopt formal
resolutions endorsing the progress made to date,
naming the individuals who would continue to bar-
gain on their behalf, and specifying the scope of
authority allowed their representatives in moving the
merger forward.  
This process of returning periodically to the boards
to renew the committee’s authority accomplished a
number of objectives.  It gave legitimacy to the
process itself, forcing anyone who might have object-
ed to the proposed merger to challenge the content of
the recommendations, not the motives of the people
making those recommendations.  It bolstered the
confidence and strengthened the hand of those who
were negotiating the merger.  At the same time, it set
limits on how far they could go on their own, re-
assuring board members who were still hesitant
about the merger that nobody was going to strike a
bargain without their knowledge and without them
getting a chance to revise or reject it.  
Private Discussions, Comprehensive Reports
Both boards were kept informed only in a general
way about the progress being made in the merger
talks.  Specific details and results of the committees’
deliberations were withheld from the boards until
the conclusion of each phase.  Decisions were then
presented to the boards as a single package, contain-
ing a comprehensive set of recommendations for
h ow the merger should proceed.  This arrangement
protected the confidentiality of the committees’ delib-
erations, allowing members the privacy and freedom
to propose ideas, explore options, voice concerns and
consider compromises that might never have sur-
faced had these discussions occurred in the public
eye.  By not reporting to the boards in a piecemeal
fashion, moreover, the committees avoided the
potential problem of having the interlocking pieces of
the merger puzzle second-guessed and possibly
rejected before it was clear how those pieces fit
t o g e t h e r.  An integrated plan for merging the two
organizations, when finally presented to both boards,
was less likely to be unraveled.  
Decision-making #1: Discussing without Deciding
During the exploratory phase of the Nashua merger,
and during the early days of negotiating the merger,
participants were given opportunities to explore in a
f r e ewheeling fashion the most difficult issues without
a ny pressure to decide them.  These breathless
glimpses of organizational serpents likely to be lurk-
ing in the weeds revealed a few to be less dangerous
than feared.  Others were rendered less harmful by
sheer repetition, defanged by their familiarity.  By the
time it became necessary to decide these issues and
to make recommendations to the respective boards,
reaching consensus proved relatively easy.  
Decision-making #2: S aving Harder Issues for Lat e r
Discussing without deciding major merger issues
had the added advantage of helping the facilitator
for phase two to anticipate which issues might be
the hardest to resolve.  The most difficult and
potentially divisive issues were bumped from earli-
er meetings of the merger committee and save d
until later.  
For example, the question of permanent affordabili-
ty arose in the committee’s second meeting.  Th e
committee side-stepped this issue by adopting an
ambiguous wording in its recommended mission
statement, saving a more detailed discussion of
permanent affordability, and arriving at a more
explicit recommendation, one month later, in its
fourth meeting.  
Another example: The committee recognized during
its discussion of service area that there was a site-
specific component to neighborhood rev i t a l i z a t i o n .
That is, there was a need for staff to be phys i c a l l y
present in a neighborhood for outreach and organiz-
ing to occur.  Th ey also recognized, however, that
this issue might be somewhat contentious, since it
required a decision about where the offices of the
merged organization should be located.  Sensing this,
the committee wisely deferred this discussion until
l a t e r.  Th ey did not return to the question of location
until the very end of their process.  
Decision-making #3: The Importance of Closure
Committee members, during the negotiations of
phase two, were encouraged to approve recommen-
dations they could support sending to their boards
for discussion and decision, even if they did not per-
sonally endorse every detail of the recommendation.
Each recommendation remained tentative until the
committee's next meeting.  After each meeting, a
report of the recommendations tentatively adopted at
that completed meeting was circulated to the com-
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mittee's members.  
The first order of business at the committee's nex t
meeting was to consider formally adopting these rec-
ommendations.  Any committee member could
request reconsideration of any recommendation pre-
viously adopted, but that opportunity lasted for one
meeting only. Then, the matter was closed, at least as
far as the committee was concerned.  Co m m i t t e e
members would get another shot, of course, once the
recommendations reached their respective boards,
but inside the committee eve r yone got only one
chance to revisit an issue that had already been
decided.  Then it disappeared from the committee’s
a g e n d a .
Maintaining Continuity
At the first meeting of the merger committee, the
members were asked to commit to a minimum of
five meetings.  They were warned that more meet-
ings might be required.  (In the end, it would take
eight meetings, over a three-month period, for the
merger committee to complete its phase of the
work.)  During that time, the composition of the
committee did not change, nor did any member
miss more than a single meeting.  Most missed
none.  Between phase two and phase three, several
new members who had not participated in the previ-
ous discussions of the merger committee were
added to the steering committee.  
The committee’s core composition, however, stayed
the same.  Indeed, this core remained constant
throughout all three phases.  Such continuity
allowed deliberations to proceed in a steady, linear
fashion, with the results of one meeting providing
the foundation for the next.  There was nearly no
backtracking to bring absent members up to date.
There was almost no second-guessing of decisions
already made.
A l t e rn ating between Big Dreams and Small Details
Amidst the detailed consideration of programs,
budgets, locations and staffs, each committee was
periodically encouraged by its facilitator to speculate
on a larger mission, a wider territory, a bigger staff
or an expanded capacity to build more housing and
to serve more people than either organization had
ever thought possible.  The small details of making
the merger were balanced by big dreams of what the
new organization might be and do.  Worrying the
details kept the committees grounded.  Exploring the
possibilities kept the committees going, reigniting
their interest in seeing the process through.
Keeping the Funders Informed—but Uninvolved
The principal public and private funders of the two
organizations, partially by happenstance and partial-
ly by design, were not represented on any of the
committees once merger talks got underway.  This
was a windfall.  
A representative of the city of Nashua had been
invited to attend the deliberations of the merger
committee because he was an ad hoc member of the
GNHDF board, but he was unable to attend. The
staff person for the Housing Futures Fund, Nike
Speltz, had also been invited, but she was out of the
country for much of 1999.  Other funders, including
the New Hampshire Housing Finance Agency
(NHHFA), United Way, and the Office of State
Planning, the agency that administers Community
Development Block Grants in New Hampshire, were
never asked.  Only Neighborhood Reinvestment, a
long-time financial backer of F HNHS, had a place at
the table, but its representative (LaRayne Hebert)
was regarded more as a provider of essential infor-
mation than a funder.
These outside organizations, all of whom had fund-
ed either FHNHS or GNHDF in the past, were kept
informed of the merger talks.  All were supportive of
the possibility that FHNHS and GNHDF might even-
tually find a way to merge.  But not having them in
the room, while the details of this merger were
being hammered out, was a very good thing.  It
allowed the representatives from the two organiza-
tions to speak more frankly about vulnerabilities in
their own operations.  It also encouraged them to
explore more freely their options for creating a more
expansive organization than anyone had envisioned
or funded heretofore — a postmerger operation that
might require more funding than the two organiza-
tions had received in the past, not less.  
Keeping the Lawyers at Bay
The Nashua merger was a process that was neither
d r i ven nor dominated by law yers. Admittedly, the
long wait for a definitive opinion about the best way
to structure the postmerger corporation created diffi-
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culties and delays.  An attorney should have been
recruited and hired much sooner.  Nevertheless, it
was still the right decision to let representatives from
the two boards determine the merger’s fundamental
shape and form before an attorney was brought into
the process.  Th ey were the ones who had to make,
and to own, the key decisions defining the new orga-
n i z a t i o n ’s mission, governance, clients, target area
and the like.  Th ey did so, and did a very good job,
without a hired attorney in the room.  
It was prudent as well to defer any legal rev i ew of
the postmerger structure until Neighborhood
R e i nve s t m e n t ’s rev i ew team had examined the oper-
ations and assets of both organizations.  Had deep-
seated problems been discovered in this rev i ew, it
might have changed the attorney ’s scope of work and
the attorney ’s recommendation about structuring the
postmerger organization.  Doing due diligence before
starting work on the legal aspects of a merger does
not save time, but it can save money and, possibly,
later aggravation, focusing that legal work where it
can do the most good.
Due Diligence
Due diligence came rather late in the process of
merging FHNHS and GNHDF.  As phase three wa s
beginning, a rev i ew team from Neighborhood
R e i nvestment visited both organizations and con-
ducted a close examination of their finances, sys-
tems, portfolios, policies and procedures.  A written
report of the team’s findings was made available to
the steering committee and to the boards of both
organizations a month later, in December 1999.  It
a r r i ved in the nick of time.  The weaknesses reve a l e d
in this report became, in effect, a checklist of issues
that the steering committee would need to address in
order to implement the merger.  The strengths
r evealed in this report — specifically, the finding of no
financial time bombs ticking away within the
finances or portfolios of either organization —
became the basis for the committee’s decision to con-
summate the merger by simply transferring assets
from FHNHS to GNHDF (after amending GNHDF ’s
by l aws). Given the absence of life-threatening prob-
lems lurking beneath the surface of the two organi-
zations, there was no need to create an entirely new
corporation to receive the assets of both FHNHS and
GNHDF. 
Due diligence was performed soon enough in the
Nashua process to make the merger possible, but
should it have been done earlier in the process to
h ave made the merger easier?  One answer is that
the sort of scrutiny that was done by the
Neighborhood Reinvestment rev i ew team should
only take place after negotiations of the merger com-
mittee are finished and after the decision to merge is
made.  To do so any earlier might have undermined
the process of building trust and reaching consensus
that was going on in phase two. Such scrutiny wo u l d
probably have raised the hackles of staff, since both
organizations were operating with minimal person-
nel throughout the merger talks. 
GNHDF ’s ex e c u t i ve director, in particular, had neve r
been subjected to the standards and procedures used
by a Neighborhood Reinvestment rev i ew team to
evaluate her organization. She would have consid-
ered such a rev i ew to be both onerous and disruptive
of her determined efforts to keep units mov i n g
through the development pipeline.  It can be argued,
in short, that due diligence was performed in Nashua
at precisely the right time, following the negotiations
of phase two and preceding implementation.  
On the other hand, an argument can be made that an
o b j e c t i ve assessment of the strengths and we a k n e s s-
es of both organizations might have been useful ear-
lier in the process. It might have allowed the negotia-
tions of phase two to consider more closely and to
r e s o l ve more precisely some of the personnel issues
that proved so troublesome in phase three.  Had the
merger committee had a clearer sense of the inade-
quacies to be found in the policies, procedures and
s ystems of the parties invo l ved in these merger talks,
work might have begun long before the spring of
2000 to strengthen these organizational elements.  
It might be argued, in short, that too much time wa s
spent during the exploratory phase emphasizing the
strengths and compatibilities of the two organiza-
tions, with not enough spent assessing what needed
to be “fixed” in each organization to make it a wo r-
t hy partner.  Due diligence, in this perspective ,
should have been done during phase one, prov i d i n g
grist for the negotiations that occurred in phase two.  
Regardless of whether due diligence is done during
exploration or following negotiations, it is clear that
it must be done thoroughly and objectively before the
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merger is finalized.  Every merger is driven by the
bountiful promise of efficiencies, enhancements and
r ewards lying just beyond the horizon.  Every merger
is contingent, however, on the successful manage-
ment of anxieties, risks and costs lurking in the here
and now.  Assessing these risks, counting these costs
and assuaging the anxiety of both the prudent and
the paranoid is the necessary work of due diligence.
It can be done early.  It can be done late.  It must be
done well.  
Bridging the Organizational Divide
The ultimate lesson of the Nashua merger is that dif-
ferences and distances between two nonprofit organ-
izations can be bridged, even when competition or
occasional conflict has marred previous interactions.
Building this bridge is not quickly or easily done,
h oweve r.  Nor is success assured once the process
has begun.  
While exploring collaboration, the process itself may
r eveal an inability on the part of key participants to
conduct the sort of civil, self-critical conve r s a t i o n
among equals that collaboration requires.  Wh i l e
negotiating the terms of collaboration, the partici-
pants may discover what they believed were recon-
cilable organizational differences to be, in actuality,
deeply entrenched incompatibilities of values, poli-
tics or priorities.  While implementing a plan of col-
laboration, the participants may discover what they
b e l i eved were curable organizational difficulties to
be, in actuality, fatal flaws.  Nearly always, these are
deal-killing discoveries.  
That none of them emerged during the Nashua
merger was due, in equal measure, to the good will
of those participating in the process, the good wo r k
of those conducting the process, and the good luck
that blessed the process from the very beginning.  Al l
three were essential to making this nonprofit merger
a reality. i
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INCUBAT ION
1 988 Incorporation of the Greater Nashua Housing and Development Foundation (GNHDF )
1 99 1 Incorporation of French Hill Neighborhood Housing Services (FHNHS )
1 997 April 
Assessment of strengths, weaknesses and opportunities for collaboration among New Hampshire’s 
nonprofit housing organizations (including FHNHS and GNHDF), conducted by the New Hampshire 
Nonprofit Housing Network 
June 
Assessment of FHNHS/ GNHDF merger possibilities by Nike Speltz and Mike La Fontaine on 
behalf of the New Hampshire Housing Futures Fund 
1 998 September 
Departure of FHNHS ex e c u t i ve director
E X PLOR AT ION
1 999 February 14
At the instigation of Debbie Miller, chair of the FHNHS board, representatives of FHNHS and GNHDF 
meet with Mike La Fontaine and Nike Speltz to discuss the opportunity for merger presented by depar-
ture of FHNHS ’s ex e c u t i ve director.
March 16
Exploratory committee, meeting #1. Representatives of FHNHS, GNHDF, the New Hampshire 
Affordable Housing Network and two funders (Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation and New 
Hampshire Charitable Foundation) meet to explore the possibility of an FHNHS/ GNHDF merger.  
March 26
Exploratory committee, meeting #2.  Facilitated by Mike LaFontaine, this meeting weighed the pros 
and cons of a possible merger and identified components of a mission statement for the merged 
organization.
April 8
Conference call among the FHNHS president, GNHDF ex e c u t i ve director, Neighborhood Reinvestment 
field representative, Mike La Fontaine and John Davis.  Planning for phase two of the merger process, 
including the possibility of hiring Davis to facilitate the negotiations.  
April 9
Exploratory committee, meeting #3.  Exploration of various options for structuring a merged organiza-
tion.  Decision made to hire Davis to facilitate phase two of the merger process.  
M ay 
The boards of FHNHS and GNHDF approve formal resolutions, drafted by La Fontaine 
Appendix A
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NEGOT I AT ION
1 999 M ay 28
Merger committee, meeting #1.  Representatives of FHNHS and GNHDF, joined by Neighborhood 
R e i nve s t m e n t ’s La R ayne Hebert and Mike La Fontaine, convene for the first time as the FHNHS/ GNHD
merger committee.  Davis presents a plan and timeline for negotiating key merger issues.  Topics: com
mittee roles and rules, committee composition, process for decision-making, confidentiality, merger 
tasks and sequence of events for upcoming meetings.
June 18
Merger committee, meeting #2.  To p i c s : mission and purposes, service area, beneficiaries and existing 
p r o g r a m s .
July 2
Merger committee, meeting #3.  To p i c s : service area, beneficiaries, new programs, permanent afford-
ability and board composition.
July 16
Merger committee, meeting #4. To p i c : board composition.
July 30
Merger committee, meeting #5.  To p i c s : board composition, board selection, membership, term of 
office for directors, board voting (quorum and proxy vo t e s ) .
August 13
Merger committee, meeting #6. To p i c s : p r oxy voting, standing committees, affiliations and staffing plan.
August 27
Merger committee, meeting #7.  To p i c s : post-merger staffing plan, transition staffing plan, tasks and 
timeline for completing the merger, hiring an attorney, combined budget and location of postmerger 
o f f i c e s .
September 10
Merger committee, meeting #8.  To p i c s : a t t o r n ey and other consultants needed to complete the merger, 
corporate structure and postmerger transfer of assets, operating budget, location of postmerger offices, 
name of merged organization, approval of tasks and timeline for completing the merger.  A decision 
was made to hire Carolyn Benthien to facilitate phase three of the merger process (implementation). 
IMPL EMEN TAT ION
September 23
FHNHS board meeting.  Board approves a formal resolution endorsing the proposed merger of FHNHS 
and GNHDF in accordance with the merger committee’s recommendations.  Resolution also names five 
persons to a “merger steering committee’’ and grants the committee the authority “to take all actions 
necessary to prepare for the merger of FHNHS and GNHDF and to manage the affairs of both organiza-
tions during the period prior to the merger.’’  
October 5
GNHDF board meeting.  Board approves a formal resolution endorsing the proposed merger of FHNHS 
and GNHDF in accordance with the merger committee’s recommendations.  Resolution also names five 
persons to a “merger steering committee.’’ and grants the committee the authority “to take all actions 
necessary to prepare for the merger of FHNHS and GNHDF and to manage the affairs of both organiza-
tions during the period prior to the merger.’ ’
October 13—15
On-site program rev i ew of FHNHS and GNHDF conducted by Neighborhood Reinvestment team (A. 
Cuozzo and J. McFate). 
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IMPL EMEN TAT ION
1 999 October 28
FHNHS annual meeting.  Membership approves formal resolution endorsing the proposed merger of 
FHNHS and GNHDF and ratifying the September 23 decisions of the FHNHS board establishing the 
merger steering committee and granting that committee the authority to manage the affairs of both 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
N ovember 5
Steering committee, meeting #1. Topics: tasks and timeline for completion of merger, and roles and 
responsibilities of merger committee.
N ovember 8
A set of revisions to GNHDF ’s by l aws prepared by Davis and distributed to the steering committee.  
These revisions incorporate the merger committee’s recommendations for structuring the post-merger 
o r g a n i z a t i o n .
N ovember 29
Steering committee, meeting #2.  To p i c s: FHNHS and GNHDF operational issues, attorney search and 
selection of corporate name: Neighborhood Housing Services of Greater Nashua.
December 6
Steering committee, meeting #3.  To p i c s : FHNHS and GNHDF operational issues, proposed hiring of 
community organizer, and rev i ew of roles and responsibilities for ex e c u t i ve director.
December 8
Program Rev i ew Assessment Report provided to the boards of FHNHS and GNHDF by Neighborhood 
R e i nvestment program rev i ew team.
20 0 0 January 6
Steering committee, meeting #4.  Topics: FHNHS and GNHDF operational issues; attorney hired to pro-
vide counsel on corporate merger; approval of job descriptions for community organizer, ex e c u t i ve 
director, asset manager and rehab specialist; rev i ew of board job description; discussion of report from 
Neighborhood Reinvestment program rev i ew team.
January 12
Neighborhood Reinvestment consultant, Jim Word, on site in Nashua to rev i ew computer systems and 
financial operations of both organizations and to recommend measures for integrating the two .
January 27
Steering committee, meeting #5.  To p i c s: approval of job descriptions for office manager and loan offi-
cer, approval of personnel policies and funding request for community organizer.
April 3
Steering committee, meeting #6.  To p i c s : r ev i ew of attorney ’s opinion on completing the merger, rev i ew 
of Jim Wo r d ’s report on financial consolidation, personnel and board recruitment.
M ay 30
Organizational board meeting for Neighborhood Housing Services of Greater Nashua (NHSGN ) .
June 24
Staff and board retreat.  NHSGN bylaws formally adopted.  A strategic plan outlined for the new
organization. 
July 1
Official date for completion of FHNHS/ GNHDF merger.
Chronology of the
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